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"Beautiful she had never been, but she had looked kind and
happy; now she had fallen off so that you might well believe
she was ten years older than her husband, and not only
three. Most folk deemed she took the loss of her children
harder than most wives - she lived in great plenty and in
high esteem, and things were well between her and her
husband, so far as people could see; Lavrans did not go to
other women, he took counsel with her in all affairs, and,
sober or drunk, he never said a harsh word to her. Besides
she was not so old but she might yet bear many children, if
it were God's pleasure."
From Kristin Lavransdatter by Sigrid Undset.

ABSTRACT.

Economic theories of fertility are tested on Norwegian bime
series data for the period 19 62-1991. The Easterlin hypothesis
receives the most attention, and generally little evidence is
found to support this hypothesis. Large relative cohort size
ratios, however, seem to support the Easterlin hypothesis more
than small ones. A New Home Economics model with a special
emphasis on male income and female wages is also estimated, and
results are obtained favoring this model. Finally, the problem
with effective time lags in economic fertility models is tested,
and in general an effective time lag of two years is favored.
Since women's liberation is social liberation, the New Home
Economics model predicts a rather dark picture of future
fertility. Based on the empirical results, increased equality
between the sexes will have the unevitable side effect of reduced
fertility.
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1.0

INTRODUCTION.

Since before the days of Thomas Robert Malthus and David
Ricardo, demography and economics have been closely
interconnected.

In particular, investigations to reveal the

interaction or causality between population growth and growth of
the economy have received great attention. The question of which
came first, the chicken or the egg, is a better known example of
a similar causality problem.
The fertility revolution and the demographic transition are
notions of interest to a variety of different academics, even
though they are demographic concepts. The interest is so
dispersed that psychologists, sociologists, economists,
anthropologists and geographers, among others, are researching
the demographic transition. This makes demography one of the most
interdisciplinary research fields, and thus one of the most
interesting and controversial.
The population debate has become a distinct subfield in
economics, and several models have been developed to explain
among other things fertility trends. In this paper I will examine
two of the most prominent economic fertility models on Norwegian
time series data from 1962-1991. First, I will examine the
Easterlin Hypothesis. This is a model that incorporates economic
as well as social aspects of fertility behavior, however,
Easterlin is a Professor in Economics and the Easterlin
Hypothesis is considered an economic model of fertility. Second,
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I will examine the New Home Economics (or Chicago School)
approach as represented by Butz and Ward (1980). Their model is
based on economic microfoundations, and only economic variables
are considered. Finally, I will present a discussion on
instruments that are expected to influence fertility as well as
other population features. This is the policy section, and
pronatalist policies are central. Most importantly, I will
examine the possible effect pronatalist policy may have in
Norway. However, before I start to dig into the essence of this
paper, I feel that a historical review is appropriate.
Today, population growth in most less developed countries is
extremely high, whereas the situation in developed countries is
diametrically opposite, with stagnating or decreasing population.
For this reason, the determinants of population growth are quite
different among nations and across socio-economic levels. Most
populations are at or near their natural marital or biological
fertility before the onset of the so called fertility transition.
The natural marital fertility level before the fertility
transition displays large variations across populations, but is
often considered to be determined by: The Postpartum infecundable
period, the Waiting Time to Conception,

Intrauterine Mortality,

Permanent Sterility, Frequency of Intercourse and
breastfeeding

. 1

In countries where the fertility transition has been
completed, family limitation practices exist. These family
limitation practices can be divided into two groups: direct and
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indirect family limitation. Direct family limitation are
deliberate actions undertaken by married couples to reduce the
number of child births, e.g., use of contraception, induced
abortion and sexual abstinence. Indirect family limitation on the
other hand is a sort of human behavior, which has the secondary
effect of reduced chilbearing. Indirect family limitation
includes prolonged education, inventions or increased
opportunities for other goods than children that may raise
children's relative cost, increased participation in the labor
force and delayed marriage. In most highly industrialized
countries today, indirect family limitations are becoming
increasingly more important as a determinant of child birth.

1.1

Economic Consequences of Population Features.

Another important aspect is the economic consequence of both
increased and reduced population. The consequences of an
increased population are obvious. First, when the population
increases, more funds have to be locked in as investment capital
if capital per person is to remain constant2. Second, in
scarcely populated areas, increased population may result in a
more efficient way to exploit natural resources. Third, a fast
growth rate of the population tends to increase unemployment.
Finally, it is often assumed that technological progress is
dependent upon the rate of population growth.
More recently, geographers and economists have also been
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emphasizing the damaging effect a population boom might have on
the environment. Most economists seem to agree that there are
more disadvantages than advantages with an increasing population,
or at least a booming population. A relevant question would
therefore be: Is the economy better served with a reduced
population? The answer to this question is not an easy one. A
decrease in population will increase the amount of natural
resources per person, without investments in capital. However,
the problem is that the reduced labor force will probably not be
able to handle all the capital, e.g., factories, apartments or
houses, kindergartens and schoolhouses. The prosperity of rural
areas will also become vulnerable as population declines, because
the economic foundations may collapse. Schools, post offices and
other institutions will become increasingly more expensive to
run, because there will be too few customers to cover the fixed
costs. With an increased circle of customers, the average cost
for these kinds of services will decrease. In economic
terminology this is called economies of scale. Thus, a decline in
population can eliminate economies of scale in production and
services. In response to this declining profitability of capital
in depopulated areas, these institutions may reorganize.
Finally, as is the case in developed countries where both
mortality and fertility are low, there will be an aging of the
population. This aging of the population will give the working
population, which will have decreased relatively

to the non

working population, a greater economic burden because they must
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support the non working population as well as themselves. An
income tax is the way money is primarily being transferred to the
non-working population in Norway. The demand for different
consumption and public goods will also change with fluctuations
in age structure. In demography, the economic burden of the
working population is measured by the total dependency ratio,
which is a ratio of economically active to economically inactive
people in a population. But often, because of lack of data or
severe difficulties in defining economic activity in many
countries, a ratio of age groups is used instead. Working age in
developed countries is often defined as all people between the
ages of 16 or 18 and 64, and the people outside this age range
are considered either to be children or elderly. In Norway this
dependency ratio is approximately 0.53, or 53 out of 1003.
This brief, but nevertheless important review of the
relevance of variations in population size and its composition to
economics, tells a story without clear answers. As explained by
economic theories, it seems that both a declining and an
increasing population can have adverse effects on the economy.
Therefore, on theoretical grounds, it is justifiable to examine
the population size and its composition.

1.2

The Demographic Equation.

(1) DependencyRa ti o

+El derly 1(:100
Worki ngAges
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There are four components that determine

the basic

demographic equation, or the population growth.

(2) GrowthRate=_ p t+i~p t
MYP

B
D y INM OUT
MYP MYP MYP MYP

MYP=Mid-year population.
B=Births.
D=Deaths.
INM=Inmigration.
OUT=Outmigration.

The difference between the birth rate and the death rate is often
called natural increases, whereas the difference between the
inmigration rate and outmigration rate is called net migration

. 4

In order to predict the population growth for a particular
population, one needs to find actual or estimated values for the
respective variables. A major advantage that allows for
simplification in some small developed countries with a
moderately strict immigration policy is that changes in the
fertility rate constitute almost all the population growth. This
is true in Norway, a country with approximately 4.3 million
inhabitants. First, the immigration and emigration rates have
been relatively stable since the abrupt decrease in the
emigration to the U.S. caused by U.S. immigration quotas.
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Emigration from Norway to the U.S. started in about 1825, peaked
in the 1890s, and ceased before World War II. During this period
one million Norwegians emigrated to the U.S. If one considers the
population in Norway during the same period, which ranged from 1
million in 1825 to 3,1 million in 1946 it is easy to realize the
enormous impact this emigration had on the Norwegian population
and age structure. In fact, more than 40 percent of the natural
increase during the period 1840 and 1914 emigrated to the U . S

. 5

The age structure was distorted enormously, because the emigrants
were chiefly young resourceful men.
It has been argued that the emigration to the U.S. was
caused by both push and a pull factors. It was a push phenomenon,
because the rapid growth of the Norwegian population could not
provide adequate living conditions for people in the uncultivable
regions of Norway. This resulted in farm subdivisions and
individual loss of land at a time when Norway's industrial growth
was insufficient to absorb the increased population, especially
in urban areas. The emigration also reflected a pull phenomenon,
primarily because "The New World" had not yet been settled, and
vast land areas were available to immigrants. The U.S. Homestead
Acts of 1862 and 1872, seemed to be of particular importance
because of the opportunities the Acts offered to poor
Norwegians

. 6

It has also been argued, with truth I believe, that

many more people from Norway would have migrated to the U.S. and
Canada if it were not for many intervening obstacles. These
obstacles included: financial burdens, physical hardships
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associated with long sea journeys and uncertainty about
opportunities in the U.S. and Canada.
In the period following World War II, Norway experienced
more stability, with both periods of negative net migration and
positive net migration. Since the early 1980s, Norway has become
a country that attracts foreigners because of its stable
political situation and for being one of the richest countries in
the world. The net migration to Norway during this period has
been relatively stable, averaging four thousand people yearly.
Most of the immigrants to Norway are from other developed
neighboring countries, such as Sweden and Denmark. This seems
natural, because those two countries have a lot in common with
Norway, e.g., history, culture and most important, highly similar
languages. Even though Swedes and Danes make up one-third of the
total immigration to Norway, their net immigration share is just
10 percent, because of Norwegian countermigration. The countries
that constitute the larger share of the positive net immigration
to Norway are traditionally poor countries ravaged by wars and
political and religious disorder in Asia and Africa. More
recently the former Yugoslavia and the U.S.S.R and her
independent republics have become increasingly dominant migration
forces in Europe. This is chiefly because of ethnic conflicts and
wars of independence.
Most of the immigrating people are relatively young, with
both hopes and prospects for work. It is interesting that Norway
has experienced a positive net inmigration from the U.S. since

1980, but with a large share of people fifty years and older
(approximately 35 percent). The only other countries with such a
large share of older people are Sweden and Denmark with 30
percent. The reasons for this are neither easy to address nor
within the scope of this paper.
The trend in mortality is often measured in life expectancy
at birth

. 7

This measure is also among one of the most commonly

used welfare indicators along with infant mortality rates. Low
mortality may be used as a general indicator of the level of
welfare: Since it gives more weight to premature deaths in young
ages than to those in the elderly population, it is also a good
measure.
_ S^IgdJf(x+l/ )
0
100000
2

eo=Expectation of life at birth.
X=Age.
dx=Number of people dying in a particular year of life.

More intuitively, expectation of life at age x can be expressed
as a ratio between the total number of person years lived after
exact age x (Tx) and the number of persons alive at exact age x
(lx) see equation 3*.

-ex=Expectation of life at age x.
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,_ *v e = —T^ , e0Males
.,
nA4.01 , e0Females = —8009354
A .09
(3*)
= 7401362
■■-■- =7
— — — = 80
x Ix
0
100000
0
100000
7

7

0

Both male and female life expectancy has risen markedly in Norway
since the 1800s. Systematic improvements in hygiene and health,
food production, vaccinations from infectious diseases, and a
milder epidemic climate are the most accepted explanations for
the rapid decrease in mortality in Norway until 1930.8
Figure 1. Expectation of life at birth in Norway
-For the period 1901-1990.
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Data on life expectancy at birth are printed in figure 1. Life
expectancy at birth has increased uniformly over the last twenty
years. In 1991, life expectancy at birth was 74.01 and 80.09
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years for men and women respectively. Since mortality among young
people in Norway and other developed countries today is very low,
it is mortality among the elderly that needs to be reduced
achieve a higher life expectancy.It seems that

to

the mortality

among the elderly is likely to fall somewhat, but that the
increase in life expectancy will decline. Therefore, we cannot
expect continuously rapid increases in life expectancy, and
countries like Sweden, Norway, Iceland and Germany have
experienced a stagnation in their life expectancies

. 9

I started this section with a brief review of the economic
consequences of population growth and its composition. Then I
examined the growth equation, and made it clear that in Norway
today it is the fertility level that causes most of the change in
population growth. But if more immigrants are accepted, or the
mortality rates among the elderly falls, net migration and
mortality will become increasingly important in explaining
population growth. Therefore, in the case of Norway, a study
aimed at examining the fertility trend in the last thirty years
with economic, social and political variables will be important
in two ways. First, economists are interested in the way economic
variables influence fertility. Second, the fertility rate alone
causes changes in the population and its composition, which in
turn will cause permanent changes in the economy as explained
above.

1.3

The History of Norwegian Fertility.

13

The total fertility rate in Norway was approximately 4.5 in
1850. During the next one hundred years, the period fertility
declined to 2.5, with a low of 1.78 children in 1935. This imply
that Norway experienced a continuous decline in fertility during
this one hundred year period, except for some small, but
significant fluctuations (which is consistent with other
developed countries). Why did this happen? There seems to be
strong disagreements among professionals about this issue.
Fortunately, however, there is more disagreement about each
factors' relative influence on the fertility decline than about
which factors were influential. The factors assumed to have
caused this decline include: lower mortality, increased use of
birth control, the industrial revolution, economic improvements,
and family planning.

1.4

Proposed Reasons for the Fertility Transition.

Along with most other European countries, Norway experienced
a concentrated fall in fertility during the transition from

a

pre-industrial agricultural society to an economically
diversified modern society. Thus, one would expect
industrialization to have some sort of influence on the fertility
decline. The fundamental factor is the transition from a familial
mode of production to a mode in which the labor market is
external to the family

. 1 0

This development transformed children
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from productive farm laborers and a support to their elderly
parents, into unproductive and costly investments. This
explanation is perhaps the most credible for the rapid decline in
fertility, both in Norway and the rest of Europe

. 11

Along with

industrialization, came urbanization. Mass education systems in
urban areas further reduced the labor utility of children. In
1850, 15.6 percent of the Norwegian population lived in urban
areas, today approximately 72 percent of the Norwegian population
lives in urban areas, and 25 percent of the total population
lives in the three largest cities (Oslo, Bergen, and Trondheim).
Also, increased monetization of the economy (particularly in
urban areas) heightened the awareness of the cost of children in
terms of purchasable goods, like clothes and food. These socio
economic ideas about marital fertility decline are seen as
economically rational. Pre-industrial (or transitional) societies
are characterized by a net flow of goods from children to the
older generation, whereas this direction is reversed during the
transition. A moral legitimation of birth control and family
planning programs emerged with the introduction of different
contraceptive devices between 1880 and 1910.12 Lower mortality,
in particular among children, reduced the demand for children
because more young people survived to adulthood. In the early
1940s, there was a dramatic increase in the total fertility rate.
This trend lasted until 1970, and is called the baby boom
experience. In each subsequent year the total fertility dropped
and reached an all time low of just 1.66 in 1983, which is far
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below the necessary replacement figure of 2.1 children. This baby
bust is often seen as a timing phenomenon in Norway, because
during this period female labor force participation and
educational status increased enormously.
Professionals expected that this baby bust would be followed
by an increase in the total fertility rate

. 1 3

It was expected

that births would be postponed because of the increase in labor
force participation and education among women, but that the
preference for children had not changed much and that the cohort
total fertility rate would be relatively stable. This did occur,
and the total fertility rate increased somewhat in late 1980s.
It is important to distinguish between the period total
fertility rate and the cohort total fertility rate and their
effects on both micro and macro levels. The cohort total
fertility rate has some influence on both micro and macro levels.
First, it is the cohort total fertility rate that determines the
long run population growth. If the cohort total fertility rate is
less than approximately

2

.

1

in the long run, the population will

decrease if net immigration is zero. Second, the cohort total
fertility rate reflects how many children the women born in the
I

same year or cohort have during their fertile years. The period
total fertility rate determines the number of children born every
year, and thus the cohort size. Large variations in the period
total fertility rate cause, as I mentioned above, trouble for
policy makers. An interesting approach is to examine the
relationship between the period total fertility rate, and the
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cohort total fertility rate. If one lag the cohort total
fertility rate by 30 years (which is approximately the mean age
of childbirth), one would expect the cohort total fertility rate
and the period total fertility rate to be identical. If they are
not equal, births are either postponed or accelerated. Figure 2
takes this effect into consideration. If the period total
fertility rate is higher (lower) than the cohort total fertility
rate for any period, births are accelerated (postponed).
Therefore, in Norway births were accelerated between 1950-1970
and postponed between 1971-1990.

Figure 2. Period and cohort fertility.
-The cohort fertility

is lagged 30 years.
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This reconstruction of Norwegian demographic history, is not
much different from the history of other developed countries (or

17
at least Norway's neighboring countries). Therefore, it serves
more as a motivation for the following econometric analysis, but
first I would like to stress a very central question: can
fertility be explained or analyzed with economic variables?
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2.0

ECONOMIC

THEORIES

OF

FERTILITY.

In economic theories of fertility, it is common to view the
decision to have children in the same way as purchases of durable
consumer goods. Economic theories of fertility are not meant to
explain why couples have children (which is the concern of
sociologists and psychologists) but rather how changes in
economic variables can be expected to influence fertility. This
is not different in principle from the economist's objective to
explain demand for other durable goods, like cars and
televisions. And as is the case with the demand for children,
economists have less interest in (or rather, are not preoccupied
with) why people buy such goods as cars and television. It is the
changing demand as a function of prices and income that interests
economists. Nevertheless, economic fertility theories are
disputed matters. Critiques are often directed at the assumption
of rationality. If one assumes rationality, one expects the
family to make its best decisions based on all available
information, which is often not the case.

2.1

The Family.

By a family, I mean a household composed of parents (husband
and wife) and children from which the parents receive direct
utility.14 A family unit makes several choices about its
fertility. First, the family needs to decide how many children it
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wants to have. Second, the family has to decide the quality of
the children. By quality I mean the average level of expenditure
per child as defined by Becker.15 Finally, it is important to
determine the timing and spacing of births. These are all
important issues that families must consider.

2.2

The Classical View of Fertility.

The idea that fertility is closely related to economic
factors was promoted already in 1798 by Thomas Robert Malthus in
his First Essay on Population. In this essay Malthus formulated a
theory about the factors that influence fertility and mortality.
In particular, he argued that an increase in family income (above
subsistence) would increase fertility. This increase in fertility
would be caused by two sources, Malthus argued. First, increased
income would accelerate marriages and thus fertility. Second, the
infant mortality rate would decline because of improved material
standards. Malthus' more famous argument that populations tend to
grow faster (geometrically) than food supply (arithmetically),
along with his theory about positive and negative checks should
require no explanation. Much has changed since Malthus developed
his population theories: Most importantly, the industrial
revolution changed family life, and possibly families1
preferences.

2.3

More Recent Fertility Theories.

20

Today, it is common to divide the economic theories of
fertility into two directions (or schools). One of the schools is
represented by Theodore Schultz and Gary Becker, and is called
the New Home Economics or the Chicago School. The main "rival" to
the Chicago School is represented by Richard Easterlin, in which
the Easterlin Hypothesis is central.

2.3.1

Theodore Schultz.

The importance of Schultz in the economics of fertility is
j '
perhaps best stated by Willis (1987), I quote:

Theodore Schultz (1974) volume consolidated the
theoretical work of the previous decade, struck of in new
theoretical directions, and began to address the
empirical content of the theory with the aid of largescale micro data sets and new econometric methods,

(see page

69) .

Therefore, besides being an important family economist himself,
Schultz also assembled much of the previous work in the field and
made it available to the public. It was from this point the
economics of the family emerged as a distinct subfield in
economics. Even though Schultz made important and lasting
contributions to family economics, he is probably best remembered

21
as one of the "forefathers" of endogenous growth.

2.3.2

Becker.

Becker (1960) was the first to utilize neo-classical
consumer theory, in which the demand for children can be compared
with the demand for durable consumer goods, to analyze fertility.
This implies that it is possible to put a price on children.
Important assumptions in this theory are, constant preference
structures, rational behavior, that the demand for children has
positive income elasticity, and that the families have to take
price as given. Constant preference structures imply that
preferences for children are constant over time. This, as I will
explain later contradicts Easterlin's theories. The families have
to take the prices as given because they are too small and have
no market power.
Many empirical studies have been conducted to test whether
or not the assumption about positive income elasticity can be
verified, but have had mixed results.16 In order to explain
these results, the quality of children was introduced into the
respective families utility functions, along with the other
arguments: number of children and other goods. This provides a
partial explanation of why the number of children can be
negatively related to income (and are therefore not inferior
goods). The shadow price of quality (quantity) depends upon the
quantity (quality). Quality is assumed to have higher income
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elasticity than quantity, but both are positive. An increase in
income will therefore influence quality more than quantity, which
implies that the shadow price of quality (quantity) decreases
(increases). It is also reasonable to assume that the income
elasticity for quality of children is higher among high income
groups than low income groups (or among developed countries
versus undeveloped countries). Becker also incorporates the cost
of time in his fertility theories. He realizes that child rearing
is time intensive, and that this usage of time has an opportunity
cost. Becker’s coherent theory is mostly used in cross sectional
empirical work to study differential fertility.
Butz and Ward (1979), made a noteworthy extension derived
from the New Home Economics. They argued that a complex relation
between male and female wages determines fertility. In
particular, a woman’s participation in the labor force is viewed
as a function of her own earning potential and her husbands
earnings. If, as Butz and Ward assume, the household time inputs
of husbands’ and wives' are gross substitutes, then an increase
in the wage of one induce the other to substitute away from
market work. Therefore, as female real wages increases, the
opportunity cost of time spent with children will increase. The
opportunity cost of women not in employment will be unaffected,
but an increase in wages induces more females to enter the labor
force at the expense of fertility. This, Butz and Ward argue,
will lead to reduced childbearing and closer spacing of births.
Male wages have the opposite effect on fertility. As male wages
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increase, the families budget constraints expands. Since both
quality and quantity of children have positive income
elasticities, both can be expected to rise. I utilize this
approach in the empirical section of this paper. Intuitively,
this reasoning can be explained in figure 3 Female wages above
an imagined reservation level (wl) in l.a increases the time
cost of children, reducing the birth probability. A similar
argument can be used with male income, see l.b Below some
level of male income (yl), the wife is in the work force.

Figure 3.

Butz and Ward approadi.
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As male income rises within this range, the birth probability
increase rapidly. Above (yl), the wife is out of work, and the
response in birth probabilities will decline.
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Easterlin.

2.3.3

Whereas Becker's theories are mostly used to study cross
sectional fertility, Easterlin's theories are used to explain
time series (in developed countries). Easterlin argues that
family preferences for children, their cohort size, and thus
relative income determine fertility.
The relative cohort size is an essential argument in
Easterlin's fertility theory. Easterlin argues that any
relatively large cohort will be at significant economic
disadvantage and that the opposite will hold for relatively small
cohort sizes. Easterlin uses this argument in his influential
book Population Labor Force and Long Swings in Economic Growth
(19 68) to explain various economic, political, and social
conditions. A particularly interesting argument that Easterlin
gives is this

Both the postwar baby boom and the subsequent baby bust
were in large part a product of swings in generation size
that affected the economic circumstances of young
adults. Because of their exceptionally favorable economic
situation, those from the small generation of the 19 30s
tended to marry earlier and have more children, the
relatively unfavorable situation of the large generation
of the 1950s made for later marriage and reduced
childbearing.
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This hypothesis has received great attention from scholars in the
past fourteen years, primarily because of its testability, but
also because the hypothesis offers an alternative perspective to
the Chicago School approach. The main difference is that the
Easterlin approach synthesizes both economic and sociological
factors, whereas the Chicago School primarily considers economic
factors. Easterlin's assumptions are somewhat different from the
Chicago School, and most importantly, Easterlin believes that
preferences are changing over time. More specifically, Easterlin
argues that preferences are shaped by people's childhood living
standard experiences. The living standards in childhood are
primarily determined by wages of fathers. Easterlin therefore
uses young men's incomes in proportion to their fathers', as a
measure of young men's living standards. Easterlin labels this,
"relative income" and it deserves special attention I quote:

The argument so far can be summarized quite simply: as
the relative income of young adults rises, they will feel
less economic pressure and hence freer to marry and have
children; as their relative income falls, they will feel
increasing economic stress, and marriage and fertility
will decline.

This definition is valuable to stress, because "relative income"
is not, as many believe the same as real income. Since different
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age groups do not represent perfect substitutes in the labor
market, young mens'

"relative income" will tend to vary inversely

with the number of young men to older men in a population. Thus,
young couples' fertility can be expressed as an inverse function
of their relative cohort size. The relative cohort size is not
the only fertility influential variable according to Easterlin,
but rather he stresses that its importance often has been
neglected, or at least understated.

/
a\
Recent income experience
man
(4)
Relative income----------------—---------of
— young
---- —---Past income of young man's parents

Equation (4) is the Easterlin measure of relative income,
but it is often measured as a ratio between old and young people
in a population. As I explained above, Easterlin argues it is a
good proxy for relative income. If this instrumental variable has
the desired properties, empirical testing can be made about the
relative income hypothesis. Since, according to Easterlin, the
relative cohort size approximately twenty to thirty years ago
influences the number of births today, his relative income theory
can be used to make predictions about future populations.
A critique or an extension of the Easterlin approach has
been suggested by Oppenheimer (1976).17 She accepted the basic
hypothesis, but rejected the way Easterlin measures the standard
of living. Oppenheimer argues that the standard of living a
person experiences while growing up is influenced by other
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factors than just male wages. Among other factors, she argues
that the number of children and female wages are influential.
Consequently, Oppenheimer realizes that in order to measure
relative income, all income should be considered. Relative cohort
size, which Easterlin suggested as a measure of relative income,
will therefore be misleading.
The Easterlin hypothesis can be counteracted somewhat by
Sundts Law. The Norwegian priest and sociologist Eilert Sundt
(1817-1875) discovered the following empirical relation: If the
number of births in one period has been large, the number of
births twenty to thirty years later will be large, because of the
large share of females in reproductive ages twenty to thirty
years later. If the number of births in one period has been low,
the number of births twenty to thirty years later will be low,
because of the small share of females in reproductive ages twenty
to thirty years later.18 This phenomenon is called "generation
waves" in demography.
From figure 4, in which the total fertility rate and the
relative cohort size is presented for Norway for the period 19 621991, it is possible to get an initial impression of the
relevance of the Easterlin hypothesis in Norway. It seems that
when the relative cohort size is rather large, the total
fertility rate is also large, thus supporting the Easterlin
hypothesis. Some periods, however, do not fit this relation. The
largest drop in the total fertility rate (between 1972 and 1977)
took place when the relative cohort size increased from its all
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time low in 1972 to an average level in 1977. Following the
period after 1977, the relative cohort size approached a stable
level, but the total fertility rate fluctuated somewhat. Based on
figure 4, it seems that the Easterlin hypothesis (if relevant)
fits the period before 1972 better than the period after 1972.

Figure

Total "Fertility rate & relative cohort size.
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The Rivalry.

In the 1970s, the rivalry between the two approaches peaked.
Several empirical studies of the Easterlin and New Home Economics
models have been attempted with mixed results. To draw a
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universal conclusion about which model best fits the post-World
War II data seems impossible. This division of economics of
fertility into two schools was short lived. Sanderson (197 6)
argued that the two schools have a lot in common. Among other
things, both schools emphasize the importance of household budget
constraints and biological factors like fecundity and freguency
of intercourse. This may be true, but I think some superficial
rivalry is still present between the two schools today.
Easterlin's critigue of Paul Schultz's review of "The Fertility
Revolution" in Population and Development Review (1986) may
illustrate this point, I guote:

To sum up briefly, what is fundamentally at stake here is
the existence of two quite different theoretical
perceptions of the fertility decision process: one
influenced substantially by certain areas of demographic
research, one faithful to certain preconceptions common
in economics. This conflict reflects fundamental
differences between demographers and economists that
would benefit from more explicit recognition and
confrontation,

(see page 520).

This quotation clearly reflects that some sort of verbal rivalry
is still present and that the two schools of thought are central
focal points.
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2.4

Summary of the economic theories of fertility.

Economic theories of fertility became a distinct subfield in
economics in the early 1970s. Easterlin, Becker and Schultz were
among this field's pioneers. Today, economics of fertility is
still a hot issue, and one can sense a change in attitude among
the economists toward more interdisciplinary cooperation. This,
however, has not stopped economic fertility models from becoming
increasingly sophisticated mathematically.
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3.0

PREVIOUS

EMPIRICAL

LITERATURE.

There is an enormous range of empirical economic work that
aims at explaining the post-World War II baby boom and subsequent
baby bust. Therefore to cover them all would be beyond the scope
of this paper. I will therefore concentrate on those I find most
relevant. It is natural to divide the next two

subheadings into

Easterlin related topics and New Home Economics fertility work.

3.1

Tests of the Easterlin Hypothesis.

Since the Easterlin hypothesis concerns demographers as well
as economists, I found many articles about it in demographic and
sociology journals. Easterlin himself recommends alternative
approaches to test the relative income hypothesis (or the
intergenerational taste formation) in Birth and Fortune.

(1987).

In this book, he uses the total fertility rate as a measure of
young couples' fertility. The reason for this, he says, is that
changes in the total fertility rate are dominated by changes in
fertility among young females. As a measure of relative income,
he uses the ratio between young and old men, or the relative
cohort size. The relative cohort size is presented as a ratio of
males aged 35-64 to males aged 20-34. Then he plots the data for
both variables on a graph, and then concludes that the evidence
supports the relative income hypothesis, both for the baby boom
and baby bust in the U.S.
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Robert E. Wright has done several important studies of the
Easterlin hypothesis in Canada and Europe.19 As a measure of
fertility he uses the total fertility rate, and the relative
cohort size is defined as the ratio of the male population age
30-64 to the male population aged 15-29. Wright explains that the
fertility trend in Belgium, England and Wales, Germany, Spain,
Switzerland, and Norway have been the same during the period of
1950-1985. In all the cases, Wright explains the trend as an
inverted-U, with fertility increasing in the 1950s, reaching a
peak in the 19 60s, and declining below the replacement level in
the 1980s. He examined 16 European countries, divided into four
subgroups: Western Europe, Northern Europe, Central Europe, and
Southern Europe.
What he found universally, except for Finland and Greece,
was that the fertility trend in all these European countries has
been down since about 1965.20 Wright argued that the Easterlin
hypothesis was not a valid hypothesis for most European
countries. He gave two reasons for this belief. First, with the
exception of four countries, the relative cohort size has been
rising in the 1980s, whereas the total fertility rate has been
decreasing. Wright also emphasized that the rather crude way the
relative cohort size measures the relative income may invalidate
the empirical results. Second, he applied a Granger test of
causality to the relationship between the relative cohort size
and fertility. The basic idea of such a test is simple. If the
relative cohort size causes fertility, then changes in the
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relative cohort size should precede changes in fertility. For
this to be true, two criteria must be met. First, the relative
cohort size should help predict the total fertility rate. For
example, in a regression of the total fertility rate to past
values of the total fertility rate, the addition of past values
of the relative cohort size as independent variables should
contribute to the explanatory power of the regression. Second,
the total fertility rate should not help predict the relative
cohort size. If that is the

case, it is likely that one or more

other variables are causing

both the total fertility rate and the

relative cohort size. This can be tested with the Granger test,
in which a restricted and an unrestricted model are estimated.

(5 ) UR: T F R = '2 i=1a T F R t _1 + 'L™-1$ R C S t _1 + e t

(6 ) RRz T F R = 'L i=1a T F R t _1 + e t

-TFR=Total fertility rate. -RCS=Relative cohort size.
-UR=Unrestricted model.

-RR=Restricted model.

Wright applied this test to the European countries he
studied and found it hard to determine the direction of causality
between the total fertility

rate and the relative cohort size in

most countries. He did find

somesupport for the Easterlin

hypothesis in Belgium, England and Wales, France, Finland, and

34
Italy. Data from the other countries provided no empirical
support, and in some countries the causality was reversed which
implies that the fertility rate causes the relative cohort size.
Ermisch (1979) tried to explain the relevance of the two
schools of fertility theory in Great Britain. He tried to explore
the importance of the two schools using time series data for the
period 1955-75. Ermisch found that he had to reject the Easterlin
hypothesis on the basis of relative cohort size as a measure for
relative income. The variant of the Easterlin hypothesis
presented by Oppenheimer, in which the relative economic status
is a ratio between earnings of young men to total family income,
did receive some support. Ermisch wrote:21

We are, therefore, unable to refute or confirm the
Oppenheimer variant of the Easterlin hypothesis; while it
does receive some support from the evidence of changes in
the labor force participation rates of older married
women, it is still an open question whether relative
economic status, as defined by Oppenheimer is the
dominant influence upon fertility,

(see page 49).

Ermisch noted that the Oppenheimer approach is based on relative
economic status, like the Easterlin approach. Therefore, since
the Oppenheimer approach could not be refuted, the Easterlin
theory is still intact, even though Easterlin's emphasis on
relative cohort size as an instrumental variable for relative
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income was proven wrong.
Baird (1987) tests a multivariate time series model of
fertility in France, England and Wales, Sweden, and the U.S.
based on Easterlin's theories. The fertility model he tested can
be written analytically as follows:

(7) F=f (Y,A, R)

F=Birth rate.
Y=periodic economic effect.
A=Cohort labor market supply.
R=Relative employment status.

The period economic effect (Y) is lagged one year. This is done
to include the waiting time to conception and nine months of
pregnancy.22 The cohort labor market supply (A) is calculated
with the help of four different age ratios of the male
population. The relative employment status (R) is calculated for
the whole time period, and 1950 was the base year.
The inclusion of both (A) and (R) as regressors in Baird's
model may seem strange. The most common test of the Easterlin
model would be to regress (A) on (F) alone. Baird, however,
justifies the inclusion of (R) in the regressions:23

In some studies of the Easterlin model, the A regressor
is made to stand alone for the measurement of relative
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economic status. Conceptually, however, cohort related
market supply constraints and relative material
aspirations are distinctly different components of
relative economic status. Depending upon the history of
economic growth, material aspirations trends may be
treated independently of cohort labor market achievement
potential,

(see page 61).

Ordinary least squares were applied, and Baird found the relative
employment status (R) to be significant. One problem though was
the presence of first order auto-correlation.

In order to remove

the auto-correlation, Baird performed the Cochrane-Orcutt
procedure. Baird's results of this operation provide support for
the Easterlin model. In 13 out of 16 regressions, the (R) is
significantly positive. Also, in France and the U.S. the (A)
regressor is significantly positive, but in the Swedish and
English regressions, no (A) regressions are significant. The (Y)
regressor was insignificant in all the regressions, save one.
This implies that short run employment status (Y), or periodic
economic effect, has no influence on fertility. In summary, the
multivariate model tested by Baird supports the Easterlin model
of fertility.
Pampel (1993) takes on an interesting approach to explain
the Easterlin hypothesis. In particular, he argues that
institutional structures, increased female labor force
participation, and collective social protection influence the
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relative cohort size in different nations. In other words, Pampel
argues that strong national commitment to full employment may
limit the impact of cohort oversupply. Well established social
benefit structures, like unemployment benefits, may further
reduce the financial damage caused by oversupply of labor. The
effect of female labor force participation compensates for the
low male income in large cohorts. Therefore, changes in female
labor force participation tend to reduce generational differences
in economic status. These are the three arguments Pampel believes
make up most of the differences among nations and perhaps render
relative cohort size as a measure of relative income. Pampel
studied the effects of relative cohort size on fertility in 18
high-income industrial and democratic nations from 1951 to
1986.24 He found that in general, the European countries did not
support the Easterlin hypothesis. The reason for this, he
explains, is that institutional and social features affect the
degree of influence the relative cohort size has on fertility.
Pampel reasons, I quote:25

By moderating the consequences of an oversupply of
labor, such forces can hide the link between relative
cohort size and fertility. European nations that emphasize a
collectivist ideology of social protection may show weak
relationship between relative cohort size and fertility.
(see page 511).
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As usual, support for the Easterlin hypothesis was found in The
U.S. and Canada.
Jere R. Behrman and Paul Taubman (1989) examined the
relative income hypothesis in the U.S. over two generations, and
compared it to a Becker type of model with utility maximizing
parents.26 Behrman and Taubman were among the first to examine
the relative income hypothesis over two generations. This
approach requires information on income and completed family size
for two generations. Thus, their model is dependent upon
comparable quantative time series data for a rather long perod.
This may be the reason why so few academics have examined the
relative income hypothesis over two generations.
The test did not provide much support for either of the
models, but the Becker formulation proved to be the best. Again,
the data quality must be questioned. Perhaps existing data are to
poor to make qualified research.

3 .2

Tests of the New Home Economics.

To present a comprehensive and correct discussion of the
relevance of the New Home Economics based on empirical research
is difficult. More theoretical experimentation or model building
than empirical tests have been conducted, and consequently
empirical tests have been approached somewhat differently. Two
basic doctrines, however, have been central focal points, both of
which are considered basic foundations of the New Home Economics.
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-Becker's analysis of demand for children with quality and
quantity for children as central elements. The idea of altruistic
parents must also be emphasized (see e.g., Becker and Barro
(1988)). In this theory parents maximize a dynastic utility
function that requires equality between marginal benefit and
marginal cost of an additional child. Altruism implies that
parents do not only receive utility from their own consumption
but also utility from their offsprings consumption.27

-The Butz and Ward approach, or operationalization of the New
Home Economics.

Both these theories have been discussed previously and need no
further presentation. The problem though is that these two
methods are closely related, and subsequently a discussion of one
approach tends to be relevant to the other approach. This paper
primarily considers the Butz and Ward approach, but the demand
side should not be neglected.
John Ermisch examined time series data for the period 19501975 in Great Britain. 28He was particularly interested in the
Butz and Ward approach to explain fertility trends. Butz and Ward
reason that an increase in the husband's income will increase
fertility, while an increase in the wife's opportunity cost of
time (which is equal to the wage she earns, if she works)
increases the cost of children. An increase in the opportunity
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cost of time decreases fertility since child care is time
intensive. Ermisch found that the ratio of women's real wages to
men's real wages was relatively stable in Great Britain for the
period 1950-1969. After 1969, the ratio of women's wages to men's
wages rose, causing a decline in fertility. This is in accordance
with the Butz and Ward approach where an increase in the
opportunity cost of time reduces the fertility.
Butz and Ward (1979) tested their theory and found strong
positive indications that both female and male wages are
important determinants of fertility. They found (using a
loglinear model) that the elasticity of fertility with respect to
male income is significantly positive and that the opposite is
true for female wages (both at 5 percent level of significance).
Indeed, in this article they went so far as to propose that a
sufficiently large increase in female wages could cause
countercyclical fertility.
Siegers (1980) tested the effect of income for husbands and
the wages of wives on fertility using time series data for the
Netherlands. Sieger found a negative effect on fertility for
female wages and a positive effect for male income.

In other

words, Sieger's work provides support for the New Home Economics
approach. He also tested the intergenerational taste formation
model, but he found no support for this model.
Butz and Ward (1980) present a dynamic model of fertility
behavior using time series data for the U.S. over the period
1949-1975. They found that couples on the average try to avoid
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births when prospects for an increase in female wages are high,
ceteris paribus. This is in accordance with their theory since an
increase in expected female wage will raise their cost of time
and, therefore, also change fertility rates.

3.3

Summary of Previous Empirical Findings.

Overall, there seems to be more support for the New Home
Economics approach than for the Easterlin Hypothesis (at least in
Western Europe).

I am not quite sure if that necessarily implies

that the New Home Economics approach is better and that the
Easterlin approach should be discarded as a promising, but not
fruitful approach. One must keep in mind that the Easterlin
approach has been tested by professionals of several disciplines,
and in a variety of different social science journals. The New
Home Economics approach has mostly been tested in economics
journals, and one can suspect, perhaps on unjustifiable grounds,
that this may cause some bias. This bias may come about because
of the nature of publication policy which tends to be more
receptive to papers which assert positive results than those
which provide inconclusive or negative ones.
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EMPIRICAL

4.0

DATA AND METHOD.

I collected Norwegian time series data for several variables
for the period 1962-1991 (this period is chosen because of the
availability of data), but also because this period covers two
important demographic regimes. Those are the so-called baby boom,
which started in Norway during second World-War, and the
subsequent baby bust that started around 1970, and continued into
the mid-1980s. In the period after 1985 Norway, as well as
several other developed countries, experienced increased
fertility. I will present a short discussion of this period in a
chapter about pronatalistic policies, and their possible impact
on fertility.
Most of the time series data have been collected at
Statistisk sentralbyra (Statistics Norway), which is the primary
source for all the statistic material in this paper. Generally,
the statistical information is unpublished material, however,
where the statistics have been collected in published articles
etc, I will note it.
The data quality presented in this chapter can be expected
to be good. Norway along with Sweden were among the first
countries in the world to collect coherent information on
economic and demographic variables. Statistisk sentralbyra was
established in 1832 as an independent register on demographic as
well as economic variables. Even before 1832, registers on vital
statistics (births, deaths and migration) were collected in
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Norway by religious authorities. Also, in 1935 Norway was the
first country in the world to icorporate a complete input-output
analysis into the registers (see Frisch (1934)).

4.1

Total Fertility Rate.

The total fertility rate for Norway is calculated with a
period perspective. Therefore, as explained above, this measure
does not necessarily reflect the fertility of a particular
cohort. This is the dependent variable in the Easterlin
hypothesis. I found Norwegian age specific fertility rates in the
Norwegian Statistical Yearbook (1963-1992). Then I summarized the
age specific rates which gave me the total fertility rates. These
period fertility rates and the cohort fertility rates for the
period of investigation were presented in figure 3.

4.2

Relative Cohort Size.

The publication "Folkemengdens bevegelse" SSB, contains an
index of the relative cohort size (It) for the period 1962-1991.
The relative cohort size is presented as a ratio of males aged
35-64 to males aged 20-34 which is the ratio Easterlin suggests.
This ratio is expected to be a good instrumental variable for
relative income and is therefore used as the independent variable
in the simple Easterlin relation. I assume that the relative
cohort size and relative income are highly correlated, and in
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particular I assume that:

-The correlation between the relative cohort size and the error
term approach zero as the sample size gets larger.

-The correlation between the relative cohort size and relative
income is nonzero as the sample size gets larger.29

These assumptions need to be satisfied in order to make the
relative cohort size a good instrumental variable for the
relative income hypothesis.

4 .3

Male and Female Wages.

To be able to incorporate the Butz and Ward approach, I
collected data for male and female wages. These variables can be
found in "Arbeidsmarkedsstatistikk" SSB, but only in nominal
terms. I transformed the nominal variables to real variables, by
dividing the nominal variables with the Laspeyres' consumer price
index for the respective years (with 1970 as the base year).
Unfortunately,

I was not able to obtain information about

average male and female wages for the whole Norwegian population.
My data are for industrial workers only, and therefore I expect
the general trend in nominal wages among males and females to be
somewhat downward biased. I propose two reasons for this:
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-First,

Industrial workers receive lower wages than other

occupational groups, such as technical professions and skilled
trades which require a higher degree of education. The
homogeneity of industrial work also results in reduced bargaining
power over wages since most industrial workers are substitutable.

-The wage gap between male and female wages in other occupational
groups are traditionally greater than in industrial work. The
main reason for this is that labor unions are stronger among
industrial workers, and thus more able to protect female union
members.
Figure 5. Male and female wages In Norway.
-For the perfod 1962-1991.
15

ia

L
□
I
0

Year period.
a Ma Ie wages .

Fema Ie wages .

Source: Arbeldsmarkedsunderaokelsen, 1993.

Figure 5 reveals that both male and female nominal wages have
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been rising for the period 1962-1991. Male wages have been higher
than female wages for the whole period, but the wage gap has
diminished over the period. According to the Butz and Ward
approach, one could expect that the increase in male wages (or
income as they actually proposed) would increase fertility (both
quality and quantity) and that the increase in female wages would
reduce fertility because of an increase in the cost of time. This
is the case since the labor force participation among females in
Norway is so high that it is reasonable to believe that a
majority of Norwegian females will experience an increase in
their cost of time (see table 1 for details).

Table 1. Female labor force participation
in Norway(for the ages 25-66 in percent).
Y ear:

% employed:

1962
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1987

37.02
38.11
41.61
48.69
62.18
68.68
74.42

Source: Arbeidsdirektoratet.

4.4

Child Benefits.30

In 1946, the Norwegian government introduced child benefits
to parents with children under 16 years of age both for
pronatalistic and social reasons. This financial assistance
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increased over the next 2 0 years, and today child benefits in
Norway are an important integrated part of the welfare state.
Because of the large variations in stability and purpose of child
benefits in Norway during the period 1962-1991, I will discuss
the benefits in three separate sections. Most of this discussion
is based on data in Per Kolstad (1989, see endnote 30).

4.4.1

The Period 1962-1969.

During thisperiod, there was a relatively

stable

distribution of benefits. Households did not receive child
benefits for the first child, whereas benefits per child (after
the firstborn) increased. During both 1963 and 1967, the
government pursued a progressive benefit strategy.

In 1963, the

child benefits increased by 8.3%, 21.8% and 35.78% for second,
third and fourth children, respectively.

4.4.2

The Period 1970-1979.

In 1970, afinancial

benefit for the first child of 500 NOK

was granted. The child benefits for second, third, and fourth
child increased by 228%, 189%, and 160% respectively and resulted
in a less progressive benefit distribution. For the rest of this
period there was a sustained decrease in real financial aid to
children of all numbers with a few exceptions.
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The Period 1980-1991.

4.4.3

In 1980, there was a large increase in benefits that
continued through the whole period (and which is continuing). The
real percentage increase is largest for the first child, and then
decreases with each child born to the same family. Therefore,
during this period, the child benefit became even less
progressive. The importance of a progressive distribution of
child benefits will become evident in the section on population
policies.

4.4.4

Application of Child Benefits Data.

It would be desirable to include in the regression procedure
the effects of child benefits that are nonlinear functions of
birth order. I have not done this for three reasons. First, child
benefits that are nonlinear functions of birth order are
difficult to obtain. Second, I expect child benefits that are
nonlinear functions of birth order as independent variables in a
regression procedure to be collinear. I believe this, because
there is some sort of colinearity between the benefit variables.
Among other things, the benefit variables tend to increase with
approximately the same percentage over time. Finally, several
independent benefit variables would make the regression procedure
very complex. In this paper I am interested in the aggregate
effects of child benefits on fertility and therefore I am not

49
concerned with differentiated child benefits. However, as long as
the demand for children is higher than actual fertility, all
forms of children benefits can be expected to be positively
related to fertility. It has been argued that the real child
benefits for second children should be positively related to
fertility experiences in developed countries (at least in
countries with a total fertility rate below two),31 This line of
thinking is as follows: an increase in the real child benefits
for second children gives one child households stronger
incentives to have a second child, because of the potentially
improved economic conditions.

Figure 6. Child benefit for second child In real
-For the period 1962-1991.
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It is also reasonable to assume that in countries in which
the total fertility rate is somewhere between two and three,
increased real child benefits for the third child can be expected
to raise total fertility if economic factors are relevant for
households decision making. The child benefits for second
children has increased uniformly over the period 1962-1991 (in
nominal terms), with an extraordinary large increase in 1970. The
general trend has also been rising in real terms for the period
but with some periods of stagnation and decline (see figure 5).

4.5

Unemployment Insurance.

Unemployment insurance is paid on a monthly basis to
registered unemployed people in Norway (see Figure 7). In order
to be eligible for this type of benefit, laborers need one year
of full time work experience. If this criterion is not met,
laborers have the opportunity to get subsistence benefits from
the local authority. Unemployment benefits in Norway are at such
high levels that some economists have called for revisions of the
unemployment insurance system because they expect that potential
laborers put less effort into job search when they receive
unemployment insurance.
Another problem is the rather high minimum wage for young
workers which makes this group less attractive to employers. The
most important problem though is the dramatic increase in
duration of unemployment in Norway in more recent years (see
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table 2). Unemployment insurance is used as a stabilizing
instrument in macroeconomic policy but also for social reasons'
to provide purchasing power for unemployed people.

Figure 7. Unemployment insurance in Norway.
-For the period 1962- 1991,

in real terms.
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Table 2. Average duration (in weeks) of unemployment for the
years 1989-1992.

Yea r :

1989 1990 1991 1992

Duration:

23

30

31

33

Source: Statistical Yearbook, 1993.

The effects that unemployment insurance may have on fertility are
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not obvious. Several possible paths of development seem possible,
depending on male and/or female unemployment in the household. A
simple illustration of the effects of unemployment insurance
reveals this uncertainty. In a household, there are three
possible unemployment situations'. First an unemployed man, an
unemployed woman, and two unemployed adults.

-In households with unemployed males, unemployment insurance will
moderate the financial loss because of unemployment. Or,
inversely, increase the household budget (over the subsistence
benefits) and thus also the consumption possibilities.

If one

assumes, like Becker, that children have positive income
elasticities, either child guantity, quality, or both will
increase if the male in the household receives unemployment
insurance.

If the income effect for quantity is higher than the

income effect for quality, fertility will increase (and more than
quality).

-In households with unemployed females, the effect of
unemployment insurance may be different. An important aspect of
both male and female unemployment insurance is that the
unemployed do not have to work at all: This gives the unemployed
people a great deal of leisure time. This leisure time may result
in more births since the woman now has more time disposable to
give for childrearing (without experiencing a loss of income).
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-In the case where both are unemployed, the effect of
unemployment insurance on fertility is hard to predict. The
increased leisure time may increase fertility because of a
reduction in the alternative cost of time, and reduce fertility
through the detrimental effect of unemployment.

4 .6

Availability of Kindergartens.

As I have already discussed, child care is time intensive.
Traditionally, the wife in a household is the one that has to
sacrifice career and education to take care of the children.
Often a choice must be made between bringing up children or
pursuing a career. With increased female wages, the opportunity
cost of children increase, and as a consequence one can expect
the demand for children to go down. With increased access to day
care services for children, this picture can change.
I collected time series data for seats in kindergartens per
1000 children under seven years. This is the age at which most
children need day care. For example 400 seats available in
kindergartens per 1000 children under seven years implies a 40
percent kindergarted coverage.I expect that an increase in seats
in kindergartens per 1000 children will have a positive effect on
fertility. As seats in kindergartens increase, families have the
opportunity to put away their children in day care services, and
spend their time on other business. Over the period 1962-1991,
the number of seats available in kindergartens per 1000 children
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increased from 20 to 399 (see figure 8). Over this period Norway
also experienced the greatest increase in female labor force
participation.

Figure 8. Number of seats aval Iable In k i n d e r g a r t e n s .
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4 .7

Number of Female Students.

The number of female students in universities and equivalent
institutions in Norway exploded over the period 1962-1991. In
1962, there were 2778 female students at university level in
Norway, whereas in 1991, there where 35575 students (see Figure
9). This has occurred because of better job opportunities (and
higher wage potentials) and the female rights movement in Norway
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during the 1970s.32 It is also reasonable to assume that
improvements in day care for children has had some positive
influence.

Figure 9. Number of female students.
-In higher education.
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An increase in the number of female students in higher
education can be expected to result in postponements of births
(and also in reduction in the cohort fertility rates). This is
because, for most females, childrearing and studying is hard to
combine. The economic situation for most female students is also
different from other females. Female students tend to marry
later, and thus they have less economic support than married
females at the same age. It has also been established that
females in higher education place more emphasis on personal self
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fulfillment, and consequently, children play a less important
role in their lives.33
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for all variables
discussed in chapter 4. All variables have 30 observations, and
the variables cover the same period.

Table 3. Descriptive statistics for all variables.*
Variable:
N:

St. Dev.

Mean

Max:

Min:

Total fertility rate:

30

0.4801

2.16

2.93

1.65

Relative cohort size:

30

0.1332

1.77

2.17

1.61

Male wage

30

29.458

38.6

99.51

7 .39

Female wage:

30

25.691

31.81

86.67

5.09

Female education:

30

8500.2

14752

35575

2778

Child benefit:

30

3155.2

3458.1

10600

360

Kindergarten seats:

30

127.62

149.26

399

20

Unemployment benefit:

30

14909

13852

42101

1039

-------------*

'V 1

n

r-

_

• -

measured in number of children. Unemployment benefit, child
benefit, female wage and male wage are measured in Norwegian
Kroner (NOK). Female education is measured in total number of
females, whereas the kindergarten variable is measured in seats
per 1000 children under seven years.
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5.0

EMPIRICAL

RESULTS.

In this chapter both the Easterlin Hypothesis and a more
complex model with elements from the New Home Economics approach
will be tested using Norwegian time series data presented in a
previous chapter. Most of the discussions evolves around the
Easterlin primarily because the Easterlin hypothesis was created
to explain the baby boom and the subsequent baby bust period
(which is exactly the period of investigation), but also because
I have taken several demography classes in which the Easterlin
hypothesis was central. The respective models' relevance will be
discussed, and conclusions will be drawn. Then I will make
mention of the limitations of each model, and their effect on the
outcome. Finally, I will make some concluding remarks and give
guidelines for future research on the economics of fertility.

5.1

General Problems.

A question of significance is the adequacy of a time lag of
one year to account for the response in fertility. Both Wright
(1989) and Ermisch (1982) set the effective lag length equal to
one year, and in general this seem to be the accepted approach
among most economists. I argue that an effective lag length of
one year is too short because it fails to take into account the
waiting time to conception as defined by Bongaarts (1983), I
quote:
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The data in table 2 suggests average conception waits
ranging from five to ten months, with typical values near
seven months. This generalization applies to women in their
twenties; waiting times tend to be longer for younger women
in the years immediately following menarche presumably
because the incidence of anovulatory cycles is then higher.
(see page 110).

If one takes the waiting time to conception into account, it
should be obvious that a one year lag is too short. Presumably,
the correct lag should be one and a half years, but because such
data are hard to find, I propose a two year effective lag.
Therefore, all the following empirical models will be estimated
with both one and two year lags, and a comparison will be made. I
also estimated most of the models with three years effective lag,
in general these models are not able to improve the fit or the
significance of the respective variables.34

5.2

The Easterlin Model.

I used ordinary least squares (OLS) to estimate a log linear
relation between the total fertility rate and the relative cohort
size. I did this for two reasons. First, most of the previous
empirical work concerning the Easterlin hypothesis tends to
include log linear models. Second, log linear models have several
desirable properties which I will explain below. The equations

59
are:
(8) l n T F R t. = a 1 + a 2l n R C S t._1 + e c

t=1 9 6 2 1 9 9 1 .

(9) l n T F R c = $ 1 + $ 2l n R C S t._2 + e t

t = 19 6 2,...,1991.

Table 4 contains the results from the estimation procedures with
both one and two years lag. Since I applied log linear models,
the dependent variables (relative cohort size) will be in
elasticity form and therefore unit free. Consequently, a one
percent increase in the relative cohort size for the one and two
years lag models will yield a 1.8 percent and 1.91 percent
increase in the total fertility rate respectively.
From table 4 one can see that the relative cohort size is
significant because of high t-statistics both when lagged one and
two years. The t-statistics for the relative cohort size are
positively significant at 0.0003 and 0.0001 level for the one and
two year lag models respectively, and thus the results support
the Easterlin hypothesis. The Adj R-sq is 0.361 when the relative
cohort size is lagged one year and 0.458 when lagged two years.
This implies that in both models the independent variables (in
this case just the relative cohort size) are capable of
explaining about forty percent of the variation in the total
fertility rate. This is relatively good considering that the
relative cohort size is the only independent variable in both
regressions. The t-values reveal that the relative cohort size is

60
more significant in the model in which there is a two year lag:
Also the variance in the total fertility rate is better explained
by the two year lag model. Both these observations support my
claim that a two year lag model does a better job than a one year
lag model to explain the variance in the total fertility rate.

Table 4. Comparison of the statistical significance of
the Relative cohort size using log linear models
lagged one and two years respectively.*

One year lag

Two year lag

Relative cohort size:

1.800
(4.101)

1.910
(4.886)

Intercept:

-0.293
(-1.15)

-0.370
(-1.63)

0.3610
28
0.099
1. 33-1.48

0.4587
27
0.115
1.32-1.47

Variable:

Adj R-sq:
Number o b s :
Dw-statistic:
Dw-Critical:

- ..... 'XWA11
,
•
t-statistics
are given in parentheses.
The presence of a high degree of positive serial
correlation, however, makes the above discussion more
complicated. Serial correlation will not affect the unbiasedness
or the consistency of the estimators, but it will affect the
efficiency. This loss in efficiency implies that the standard
errors obtained from the OLS procedure will be smaller than the
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true standard errors. This will lead to the conclusion that the
parameters estimated are more accurate than they actually are.
This invalidates the t-tests of the parameters.
The observed Durbin Watson statistic (DW statistics) for the
one and two year lag models are 0.099 and 0.115 respectively. For
both models an observed value for DW below the low critical value
allows me to reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation.
If the DW observed is greater than the high critical value, I
will retain the null hypothesis of no serial correlation. An
observed DW in the range between the low and high critical values
leaves me with inconclusive results. From table 4 where both the
DW observed and the DW critical values are reproduced I realize
that a high degree of positive serial correlation is present.
A method that is widely used to correct for positive serial
correlation in econometric work is to present the variables, both
dependent and independent, in first differences of their natural
logarithms.35 Therefore the second model type I estimated is in
first differenced form and looks like equation (10) and (11).
(10) blnTFRc= y1+y2blnRCSt_1+et

t=1962, .. .,1991.

(11) blnTFRt= C1+ t2dlnRCSt_2+et

t=1962,...,1991,

where blnTFRt= lnTFRt- lnTFRt_1 A blnRCSt= lnRCSt- lnRCSt_x

The results of these estimation procedures are reproduced in
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table 5. Whereas the regression procedure reproduced in table 4
provided unconditional support to the Easterlin hypothesis, the
results reproduced in table 5 provide no support for the
Easterlin hypothesis. As one can see, the relative cohort size
is, statistically insignificant, when lagged both one and two
years because of the low t-values even though the relative cohort
size is still positively related to the total fertility rate.

Table 5. Comparison of the statistical significance of
the Relative cohort size using first differenced
log linear models lagged one and two years
respectively.*

One year lag

Two year lag

Relative cohort size:

0.115
(0.470)

0.330
(1.364)

Intercept:

-0.014
(-2.239)

-0.013
(-2.087)

Adj R-sq:
Number o b s :
DW-statistic:

0.0297
27
0.727

0.0320
26
0.698

Variable:

— --

. . • . •
*A11 t-statistics
are given in parentheses.
First differences of natural logarithms implies
( 61nRCSt=lnRCSt-lnRCSt-i ) .

The Adj R-sq is also very low in both cases, which implies
that only a small part of the variance in the total fertility
rate can be explained by the relative cohort size. The DW are
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still low, which may suggest that a more complex form of
correlation between the residuals may be present. Even though
this model clearly refutes the Easterlin argument, the two year
lag model has a Slightly higher Adj R-sq, and the relative cohort
size has

a higher t-value than one year lag

model. Thisagain

supports

the use of a two year lag model in

econometric fertility

analysis.
Based on a graphical presentation in one of the previous
chapters (see figure 4 page 28), I noted that if relevant, the
Easterlin hypothesis seems to fit the period before 1972 better
than the period after 1972. An interesting aspect of this is that
in the period before 1972 the relative cohort size was high by
most standards, and in the period after 1972 the relative cohort
size was

low. Is this merely a coincidence, or is it a structural

pattern which can be confirmed

by empirical

estimation.Based on

figure 4 on page 28, I create a casual hypothesis that high
values of the relative cohort size behave according to the
Easterlin hypothesis, whereas small values do not.
The reason why I divided the data in high and low
observations of the total fertility rate is simply because that
approach will give more information than estimation of a pre 1972
model and a post 1972 model. This is so, since a model estimation
that only includes high values for the relative cohort size will
also contain most observations of the relative cohort size before
1972. Stated differently, a pre and post 1972 model examination
will explain if the period before 1972 behaves according to the
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Easterlin Hypothesis, whereas a high and low model examination
will explain why. Therefore, I divided the thirty year period
into two different parts, one period dominated by high values for
the relative cohort size, and one dominated by low values for the
relative cohort size. Then I ran two separate log linear
regressions represented by equations (12) and (13).
(12) ln T F R H1= x\l + r \2ln R C S H1_1 + e H1

(13) ln T F R Lo= e i + 6 2ln R C S LO_l + e Lo

The results are reproduced in table 6.
Table 6 reveals an interesting pattern. Low values for the
relative cohort size regressed on the total fertility rate
completely contradict the Easterlin hypothesis. Not only is the
t-value for the relative cohort size low, but its relation to the
total fertility rate is also the opposite of what Easterlin
predicts. The Adj R-sq is also low.
On the other hand, the explanatory power associated with
high values of the relative cohort size is diametrically
opposite. The t-statistic are high and positive as predicted by
Easterlin. Also, the Adj R-sq is very high for a model with only
one independent variable. Thus, the casual hypothesis is
confirmed by the data. A partial explanation for this may be the
birth timing effects caused by female labor force participation
and female education which the simple Easterlin relation fails to
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take into account. As discussed previously (see page 14) this
may, in fact, be a reasonable explanation.

Table 6. The significance of the relative cohort size using
log linear models, when relative cohort size is
divided in high and low observations.*
One year lag

Two year lag

Relative cohort size:

-1.776
(-0.808)

-1.044
(-0.518)

Intercept:

1.651
(1.432)

1.233
(1.058)

0.0560
12

0.0238
12

Relative cohort size:

2.944
(8.039)

2.865
(7.915)

Intercept:

-1.047
(-4.617)

-1.000
(-4.442)

0.8196
14

0.8259
13

Variable:
Low levels:

Adj R-sq:
Number o b s :
High levels:

Adj R-sq:
Number o b s :
................

... -

...

1
*All1 t-statistics
are given in parenthesis.
.

.

The Adj R-sq is also very high for a model that has only one
independent variable. I do not know if this is a pattern unique
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in Norwegian time series data, but if not, these results surely
provide an interesting insight into the Easterlin hypothesis.
Among other things, the Oppenheimer approach to the Easterlin
Hypothesis may be more adequate than the relative cohort size
approach.
A problem that is common in all science is determining
whether changes in one variable are a cause of changes in another
variable. For example, do changes in the relative cohort size
cause changes in the total fertility rate? One approach to this
question is a test of causality developed by Granger and Sims.
The basic ideas of such a test have been discussed in chapter 3.1
page 32, and deserve no further attention.

I estimated an

unrestricted and a restricted form of the Easterlin model to test
for causality or whether the relative cohort size causes the
total fertility rate.
(14) UR:lnTFRt=Y?k.1 *iklnTFRt_k+Y;k,1 t2klnRCSt_n_k + et

(15) RR: lnTFRt=

n=2.

EL ilklnTFRt_k +et

Equations (14) and (15) represent the hypothesis (HI) that the
relative cohort size cause changes in the total fertility rate.
Since the observed F-values are greater than the critical F-value
(see table 7) for both the two and three year effective lag
models, I fail to reject the (HI) hypothesis that the relative
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cohort size causes the total fertility rate. Even though this
observation supports the Easterlin line of thought, I also need
to test the inverse Easterlin relation: that the total fertility
rate causes the relative cohort size. Equation 16 and 17
represent the hypothesis (H2) that the total fertility rate
causes the relative cohort size.
(

1

6

) UR: lnRCSt-YZrt.

K2*lnTFRt_n_k + et

(17) RR:lnRCSt=

a

-

2

.

=i XlklnRCSt_k + et

Table 7. Results of Granger causality tests of the
relationship between RCS (Relative cohort size) and
T F R (Total fertility rate). m is the number of
effective lags.
m=2 N=2 6

m=3 N=25

Null
hypothesis:

F

H i : R CS-^TFR

14.64

7.60

Yes

Yes

H 2:TFR-»RCS

11.27

3.53

Yes

Yes

F c rit

3.4

(2,24)

F

(3,23)

Fobs ^ Fop it

3.03

All F-tests are at five percent significance.

Since the observed F-values are greater than the critical F-value
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for both the two and three year effective lag models,

I fail to

reject the (H2) hypothesis that total fertility rate causes the
relative cohort size.
Failure to reject this hypothesis indicates that the
relationship between the total fertility rate and the relative
cohort size is likely to be spurious. Acceptance of causation in
both directions indicates a potential feedback effect36, and
should not be expected. Therefore, the Granger test of causality
provides evidence against the Easterlin hypothesis.

5.3

New Home Economics Model.

A brief summary of what has been established in chapter 4.
about the relation between the independent variables and the
dependent variable may be appropriate. First, male wages (which
is used as an instrumental variable for male income) is expected
to be positively related to fertility. An increase in wages will
increase consumption possibilities, and since the demand for
children has positive income elasticity, fertility will increase.
Female wages is expected to be negatively related to the
total fertility rate since the opportunity cost of time spent
with children will increase. The conjecture that female wages are
negatively related to fertility is just an empirical proposition
advocated by Butz and Ward (1979), I quote:

An increase in the wife's wage has an income effect
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proportional to her hours worked in the market place, in
addition to a pure price effect - the usual Slutzky
decomposition. The sum of these two effects may be positive
or negative. An obvious feature of this formulation is that
the income effect may grow over time if women's hours are
trending upward - for example, if working women move from
part-time to full-time employment. We have ignored this
element in our model,

(see page 321).

Female wages and male wages in equation (18) represent the Butz
and Ward approach.
Female education is expected to be negatively related to the
total fertility rate. This is so, since female students tend to
marry later, and their economic situation is often worse than
other females at the same age.
Child benefits will improve the economic situation of
potential parents. This improvement can be expected to give
incentives to potential parents to have children. Therefore,
child benefits is hypothesized to be positively related to the
total fertility rate.
An increase in availability of kindergarten seats implies
that parents can have children, and pursue other activities than
child care at the same time. Therefore, an increase in
kindergarten seats per 1000 children under seven years is
expected to be positively related to the total fertility rate.
Finally, unemployment benefits may insulate workers from the
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financial risk of unemployment. Since economic stability/support
is an important argument for families when they make their
decisions about having children, unemployment benefits are
hypothesized to be positively related to the total fertility
rate.
Table 8 summarizes the effect my so-called New Home
Economics model has on the total fertility rate. The estimated
model looks like equation (18).
(18 ) TFRt

+ V-2X 1 t-n * ^ 3 X 2 t-n * P i X 3 t-n + P 5X 4 t-n * l*6X 5 c-n *

Where n=1,2.

Variable:

+ec

t=1962,...,1991.

Expected Relationship:

Xl=Male wages.

(+)

X2=Female wages.

(-)

X3=Female education.

(-)

X4=Child benefit.

(+ )

X5=Seats in kindergarten.

(+)

X6=Unemployment benefit.

(+)

-The signs in the parentheses reflect the hypothesized signs of
the different variables.

Most importantly, the Butz and Ward approach to explaining
fertility trends seem to be supported in Norwegian time series
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data for the period 1962-1991. Female wages are negatively
related to the total fertility rate, and significant at a 5
percent level. Male wage is positively related to the total
fertility rate, and significant at a 5 percent level.
As explained previously, Butz and Ward argue that male
income should be positively related to the total fertility rate.
And since the male wage is linearly related to male income by the
hours worked, it is also reasonable to expect that male wage is
positively related to the

total fertility rate. One can expect,

however, that male wage as an instrumental variable for male
income is biased slightly upward since the numbers of hours
worked has decreased uniformly over the whole period.
For both male and female wages, the two year lag model
yields more statistically significant coefficients (or
equivalently, higher t-statistics), and the Adj R-sq is also
slightly higher in the two year lag model. This again supports
the usage of two year lag models in econometric fertility models.
The other variables,
expected to influence the

which according to theory can be
total fertility rate, are less

successful in explaining fertility movements. The number of
females in higher education is expected to be negatively related
to the total fertility rate. This hypothesis is confirmed by the
regression procedure, and the variable is significant at a 10
percent level. The availability of seats in kindergartens is
expected to be positively related to the total fertility rate.
This hypothesis cannot be confirmed by Norwegian time series data

even though the coefficient is positively related to the total
fertility rate. An explanation for this result may be the
relatively crude way in which the kindergarten variable is
measured.
Table 8. OLS model
benefits,
benefits,
still the

on: Male and female wages, child
seats in kindergarten, unemployment
females in higher education. TFR is
dependent variable.*

Number of lags.
1 Year.

2 Year.

311.3858
(1.896)

600.3743
(3.942)

Female wage:

-486.3607
(-2.519)

-753.3874
(-4.177)

Female edu:

-0.256152
(-2.075)

-0.210125
(-1.629)

Child benefit:

0.000581
(2.334)

-0.00006
(-0.223)

Kindergarten:

0.025084
(1.028)

0.019649
(0.933)

Unempl. benef:

0.038140
(0.839)

0.115038
(2.939)

Intercept:

23.70002
(3.234)

2.170511
(0.326)

Number of o b s :
Adj R-sq:
DW-statistic:

29
0.8558
0.910

28
0.8673
1.130

Variable:

Male wage:

-

1

r
*A11 -t-values
are presented in parentheses.
,

-
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Among other points the demand side for seats in kindergartens is
not even considered. Unemployment benefit can be assumed to be
positively related to the total fertility rate. This hypothesis
is confirmed in the two year lag model, but not in the one year
lag m o d e l .
The last independent variable, child benefits, is, as
expected, positively related and significant at low levels for
the one year lag model. In the two year lag model the effect of
child benefits on the total fertility rate is reversed, which
contradicts what I would expect. The t-statistic, however,
explains that even though unemployment benefits in the two year
lag model seems to be negatively related to the total fertility
rate, the coefficient is not significant.
The Durbin-Watson statistics indicate that there may be a
problem with positive serial correlation in both the one and two
year lag models which may cause the t-statistics to be
overstated. However, the DW observed in both the one and two year
lag models are in the grey or indeterminate area, which may be
due to serial correlation in the independent variables and not in
the error terms. I also estimated a semi log relation of this
model. Generally the results were the same, but the coefficients
were less significant.
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6.0

POPULATION

POLICIES.

By "population policies", I mean deliberate action
undertaken by the government to influence the size, the age
structure, the regional distribution, and the growth of a
population. The most common instruments in population policy are:

-Immigration regulations.
-Different laws concerning abortion.
-Information and distribution of contraceptive devices.
-Child benefit.
-Other financial transfer devices.
-Medical\healthcare.

Population policies can be undertaken to reduce fertility
(as in China and India) or to increase fertility (as in Germany
before and during World War II, and in Italy and France today).
In economic and sociological terminology, population policies
undertaken to increase fertility are labeled pronatalist. In most
developed countries today, the fertility rate is far below the
replacement level. This implies a decrease in population in the
future, ceteris paribus. In order to stabilize, or increase a
population, governments may want to pursue a pronatalistic
policy. A pronatalist policy can embrace two major strategies.
First, restrictions on access to contraceptive devices can be
established. Second, an attempt to influence attitudes toward
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childbearing and childrearing through provisions of financial
incentives can be made.37 However, there are several moral
issues associated with pronatalist policy that may serve as a
partial explanation why most Western European countries have been
reluctant to pursue active pronatalist policy. First, Western
European governments are reluctant to disturb the basic human
right of family size choice. Second, following the Malthusian
population doctrine and the persistent view in genetics
concerning heredity and the quality of a population, those that
are opposed to pronatalistic policy argue that any fertility
increase would take place among the poor and the inferior. Third,
many feminists see pronatalism as a means of restoring male
superiority by forcing women back into the kitchen. Finally,
there is also an economic justification problem associated with
pronatalistic policy. Generally, pronatalist policy incurs costs,
whereas the produced benefits associated with pronatalist policy
are hard to establish with certainty.
Antinatalist policies are pursued in most undeveloped and
developing countries in Southeast Asia and Africa today. The main
goal of antinatalist policies is to reduce fertility, with
familiy planning programs as the major policy instruments.

6.1

The Effects of Pronatalistic Policy.

Some empirical studies have been conducted that reveal the
effect of pronatalistic policies in developed countries. Most of
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these case studies show that pronatalistic policies have little
or no effect on fertility. Brunborg (1985), found pronatalist
policy to influence fertility positively with approximately 10
percent in Norway. All other empirical studies I examined, with
the exception of Hwang (1990), found pronatalist policies to have
less effect on fertility. Hwang discussed the importance and
differences in desired family size and actual family size. In
particular he established that as long as desired family size is
close to actual family size, pronatalist policy will have little
or no effect. Inversely, if the desired family size is
significantly greater than actual family size, pronatalist policy
may be effective. In a case where the desired family size is
lower than the actual family size, family preferences and
attitudes for children need to be influenced in order to increase
fertility.

In the early 1980s, desired family size was

significantly greater than actual family size for all age groups
in Norway (with the exception of the age group 16-20, desired
family size was approximately at replacement level)38. This may
explain the large impact Brunborg found pronatalist policy to
have on fertility in Norway.

6.2

Immigration Policy.

Immigration policies have been pursued successfully in the
U.S for a long period of time. More recently, however, illegal
immigration from Mexico and the Caribbean islands in particular,

77
have caused problems for the U.S. government. Historically,
immigrants tend to be a very select group. The immigrants to the
U.S. in the 19th century were chiefly young, resourceful men and
women (even today this is true). This made the population
composition or age structure in the U.S. advantageous since most
people were in the working and childbearing ages, and thus able
to support themselves. Today, immigrants are still young and
resourceful, but also usually well educated, richer and more
ambitious than non migrants. Therefore, in order to counteract
the aging of the population as well as depopulation caused by low
mortality and low fertility in developed countries, migration
policy may be a valid instrument.
An argument often advocated by those that oppose immigration
is that the young immigrants will grow old one day, and to accept
immigrants just implies a postponement of the age structure
problem. That argument is just partly true. A stable positive net
migration of young adults implies a larger labor force than would
have been the case without a positive net migration.
In order to be able to discuss the relevance and importance
of the migraton policy in Norway it would be helpful to examine
the basic principles underlying Norwegian immigration policy.
These basic principles are:39

-A relatively strict control of immigration.
practiced an immigration ban since 1975).

(Norway has
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-All applicants for immigration should be treated equally,
regardless of sex, religion, race, education and so on.

-All kinds of refugees (political, religious, war) are treated on
an individual basis, and are generally accepted.

-International commitments. These commitments include special
treatment of refugees and other non priveleged immigrants.

Foreign citizens intending to stay in Norway for more than 6
months are registered in the Central Population Register (CPR).
All people intending to stay in Norway for more than six months
receives an identification number. That number is used in all
statistical sources on the individual level, and makes analyzing
of behavior possible. Therefore, Norwegian society is
continuously surveyable, which makes the Norwegian data somewhat
unique, at least in European context. From 1987, all types of
asylum seekers are also included in this register.
Norway has maintained a relatively strict immigration policy
since the 1960s. There are several reasons for this. Among other
points, Norwegians are somewhat sceptic of foreign influence and
conservation of their natural peculiarities are highly valid
arguments to most Norwegians. This is perhaps why Norway still is
being referred to as Europes best kept secret. Also most
Norwegians are concerned with the prospect that imported cheap
labor may lead to a reduction in the wage level, and in the worst
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scenario, to unemployment. Generally, there has also been an
increasing hostility towards "visible" immigrants in Norway as
their numbers have grown. The fear of mass immigration culminated
when Folkeakson Mot Innvandring FMI4n (peoples front against
immigration) was established in 1984. The political impact of
this party, however, is relatively small with its one member in
the Norwegian parliament. Also, at the local elections in 1991,
Norway had three minor parties with anti immigration as their
primary goal.
As noted before (see chapter 1.2 page 8), Norway has
experienced positive net immigration of approximately four
thousand persons annually since the early 19 60s. Also most of the
net migration is from relatively poor countries in Africa,
Southeast Asia, and Eastern Europe. In 1990, immigration from
Europe constituted approximately 50 percent of the total
immigration to Norway, whereas just four percent of the net
immigration. Generally, the emigrants from Norway to Europe tend
to be of the same age as the immigrants from Europe to Norway.41
At this point it is important to distinguish between the
characteristics of an immigrant and a refugee. In statistical
reports, refugees are considered immigrants to simplify matters.
However, refugees are different from immigrants in several
respects, and most importantly, refugees tend to be of all ages.
Thus, an increase in the number of immigrants to Norway will
influence neither the age structure nor fertility in Norway much
if the larger part of the immigrants are refugees. Moreover, in
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years when the number of asylum seekers or refugees is high, the
Norwegian government tend to further reduce the number of other
immigrants in order to keep the total number of immigrants fairly
stable. Therefore in years with where there are many asylum
seekers and refugees, the Norwegian population will increase.
However, a relatively large share of the immigrants will be
infertile. In 1991 the total number of refugees was 1486, which
icludes reunification cases and persons given a permit to stay
for humanitarian reasons.42 The refugees tend to be from poor
countries which have experienced recent wars, political or
religious disorder, and famine among other factors. Typically,
those countries are also the ones that make up approximately 90
percent of the net immigration to Norway.
Table 9 presents the immigration to Norway after country of
origin. In this table, 1991 is used as a reference year. The
reason why I use 1991 as a reference year is that 19 91 was an
average year, with no large cyclical fluctuation in immigration
to or emigration from Norway. Also 1991 is a fairly recent year,
which may give a good picture of what to expect in the near
future. Even though data are available for 1992 and 1993, I chose
not to use those data as reference, because of the unusual large
impact the refugees from former Yugoslavia have on total
immigration as well as net immigration to Norway.
As can be seen in table 9, most of the net immigration is
from Asia. Viet Nam, Iran, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan are the
countries that contributes most to positive net migration to
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Norway. I argued, and explained why these immigrants necessarily
do not increase the total number of births in Norway
significantly, since many of the immigrants from Asia are
refugees.
Table 9. Immigration and emigration among foreign citizens by
citizenship of the immigrants (in 1991).

Immigration

Emigration

Netmigration % share:

Country:
Europe total:
Denmark
Finland
Iceland
Sweden
Turkey
germany
United Kingdom
USSR
Poland
Yugoslavia
France
Netherlands
Rest of Europe

7396
1809
187
284
1082
515
321
715
200
459
826
180
181
637

7202
1982
366
303
1123
139
224
1433
11
238
468
325
228
362

194
- 173
- 179
- 19
- 41
376
97
- 718
189
221
358
- 145
- 47
275

Africa total:

1358

348

1010

229
48
217
37
827

27
17
28
8
268

202
31
189
29
559

5013
Asia total:
400
Philippines
239
India
733
Iran
325
China
578
Pakistan
587
Sri Lanka
Republic of Korea 129
241
Thailand
1004
Viet Nam
777
Rest of Asia

814
48
82
106
47
163
115
20
17
26
190

4199
352
157
627
278
415
472
109
224
978
587

Ethiopia
Gambia
Morocco
Nigeria
Rest of Africa

3.33

17.34 %

72.11

82
N. America total:
Canada
USA
Rest N. America

1022
86
857
79

966
322
612
32

56
- 236
245
47

0.96 %

S. America total:
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Rest S. America

695
84
262
230
119

311
44
216
7
44

384
40
46
223
75

6.59 %

Oceania total:
Australia
New Zealand
Rest of Oceania

101
81
20
0

121
95
25
1

15585

9762

Total:

-

20
14
5
1
5823

—

100.00 %

Source: Norweginan Bureau of Statistics.

Immigrants from Africa and Asia that are still in their
fertile years, however, tend to give birth to more children than
Norwegian born females. This is because they are accustomed to
different fertility patterns in their respective home countries.
0stby (1992) examined the fertility for immigrant women by length
of stay in Norway and country of origin. Generally, he found that
women from Pakistan, Turkey and Morocco have the highest total
fertility rates, and that women from other industrial countries
have the lowest total fertility rates.
This implies that immigrant women in their reproductive ages
from developed countries have a much higher fertility than
immigrants from developed countries.

In 1987, Norwegian born

women had a total fertility rate of 1.720, and women born abroad
had a total fertility rate of 2.193. The total fertility rate for
all women in Norway in 1987 was 1.745, which implies that foreign

83
born women increased the total fertility rate in Norway by 0.025
in 1987. For the years 1988-1991, foreign born women in Norway
"caused" the total fertility rate to increase by approximately
0.02.43 The total fertility rate among the immigrants from
developed countries (excluding refugees) displays a strong
association between fertility and duration of stay in Norway.
This implies that immigrants from the third world countries adapt
to Norwegian fertility patterns relatively fast.
Table 10. Total fertility rate for immigrant women, by length of
stay (in years) in Norway. (1991). (Oth=other).
I

-2

CM

Length of stay:

5-6

7-9

10-12

13+

Country:
Scandianavia:
Europe (minus Turkey):
Oth. industrialized countries:
Pakistan, Turkey, Morocco:
Oth. third world countries:

1.4
2,4
1/9
6,8
3,4

2,1
2,2
2,0
4,8
2,6

2,2
1/9
1/9
3,5
2,5

Source: Utenriksdepartementet, and 0stby (1992)

2,2
1/6
1/5
3,4
2,0

1,8
1/4
1/8
3,0
2,2

1/7
1/5
2,0
2,9
2,1

•

Another important aspect to consider is repatriation.
Repatriation is not a distinct part of Norwegian immigration
policy, even though more recently an increasing share of
immigrants have returned to their country of origin. Most of the
return migrants are people from developed countries, whereas
people from less developed countries tend to become permanent
citizens of Norway.

6 .2.1

EC Membership and Migration.
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The Norwegian government recently sent in an application to
join the European Community (EC), and we will have a referendum
in November of this year. As one can expect, small farmers and
coastal fishermen generally oppose membership (because of
potentially worsened economic conditions), whereas capitalists
and large corporations tend to advocate a possible EC
membersship. Most EC and European Free Trade Association (EFTA)
countries have an interest in evaluating the possible effect of
the Single Market for immigration within the member countries. In
Scandinavia, we have had a free Nordic labor market since 1954.
The total effect of this agreement on migration between the
Scandinavian countries is not clear. What is clear, however, is
that labor force conditions are important for the migratory
pattern. There have been short term streams between the
Scandianian countries when one or more of the countries
experience abnormal fluctuations in the unemployment level. Also,
when the general level of wages is higher in one or more of the
Scandinavian countries, people from the other countries tend to
migrate.
Membership in the EC can be expected to have approximately
the same influence on the Norwegian migratory pattern as the free
Nordic labor market. The free movement of people between the
European countries will be dependent on work prospects and the
general wage level, as well as the distance between countries.
The regional distribution of people in Norway, on the other hand,
can be expected to change dramatically. The common agricultural
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policy in the EC will harm the Norwegian farmers, since they will
have trouble with staying competitive. Internal migration to more
urban areas in Norway (the southeast coast, and the westcoast)
must be expected.
At this point, it is also uncertain how intergrated the EC
will become in the future. If both goods and capital markets
become completely integrated, international trade issues become
regional in nature. The main difference between regional trade
issues and international trade issues is in the mobility of
factors of production. Factors of production are highly mobile
between regions, but less mobile between nations. This causes
regions to compete for the mobile factors of production (people
i

included). Therefore, in the long run trade will be based on
absolute advantage rather than comparative advantage.

In the

extreme case, people and other factors of production would move
to the regions that pay the most (or the ones with the highest
productivity), and less productive regions would just disappear.
A general perception among economists as well as demographers is
that the most productive areas tend to cluster around urban
centers. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that an extremely
integrated EC would further reinforce the urbanization process.
The potential urbanization process that may take place in
Norway due to an EC membership is undoubtedly one of the
strongest arguments against EC membership for Norway. Recent
surveys show that approximately 54 percent of the Norwegian
population opposes EC membership.44 When it comes to population
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policy, regional aspects have an important position in Norway.
This is because of geographic location, and the mere shape of the
country. Norway is extremely elongated, approximately eighteen
hundred miles in lenght and just three hundred miles at its
widest points, averaging just ninety miles. Therefore, in Norway
it is important to maintain strategic rural population districts
in order to be able to support all sorts of infrastructure
between the various regions of the country. Without hesitation,
it is reasonable to claim that people as well as policy makers in
Norway today are more concerned with regional population issues
than with the prospect of a depopulation in the future.

6.3

Empirical Results in Retrospect.

The empirical section (see chapter 4) examines several
variables expected to influence fertility. Of those variables,
only child benefits can be looked upon as a direct instrument
used for pronatalist purposes. Therefore, child benefits will be
addressed in a separate chapter (see chapter 6.3.1). However, in
its broadest sense, all policy that influences fertility can be
considered pronatalist. The total number of seats available in
kindergartens can be viewed as a pronatalistic instrument, and
also as an instrument used to create job opportunities. The
primary purpose of Unemployment benefits is to level out
differences in disposable income in the same way as progressive
taxes. The potential effect unemployment benefits can have on
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fertility is of a secondary nature, and not considered when
policy makers develope the structure and provision of
unemployment benefits. Therefore, unemployment benefits must be
viewed as an indirect pronatalist instrument. The other
variables, female and male wages, and female education all have
influence on fertility, but in a strict sense they are not
pronatalist variables.
The empirical results in chapter 5.3 provide some
information on how to increase fertility in Norway. It seems that
an increase in male wages, child benefits, unemployment benefits,
and seats available in kindergartens will increase the total
fertility rate, whereas an increase in female wages and the
number of female students will decrease fertility.
To decrease the number of female students and female wages
in order to achieve increased fertility is an unacceptable policy
in developed countries today. Equality among the sexes is among
the main goals of most developed countries, and a reversal of
this process is neither possible nor desirable. Assuming like
Butz and Ward that male and female time inputs are gross
substitutes, an increase in male wages relative to female wages
might induce females to leave the labor market and perhaps have
children instead. However, this type of policy is also
unacceptable by the same reasoning as above. Therefore instead of
an increase in the male to female wage ratio, it is reasonable to
assume that the male to female wage ratio will decrease. This
again will increase the opportunity cost of time for females, and
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thus reduce fertility. It may seem that because women's
liberation is social liberation, we will have to accept the
unevitable side effect of reduced fertility. In order to
compensate for this reduction in fertility, other policy
instruments must be considered.
The first best policy would be to decrease the opportunity
cost of time for females without having to distort labor market
conditions. Since real income determines the ppportunity cost of
time, higher tax rates would influence the opportunity cost but
also the labor force participation among both sexes. In some
countries

on the other

hand, tax rates are among the highest (if not the highest) in the
world, and would therefore be difficult to increase much more.
Social changes that give incentives to females to have
children while staying employed have been fruitful approaches in
Norway. Among other things, paid maternity leave, parents' right
to part-time work, child benefits, and public! daycare have been
policies utilized to increase fertility. Paid maternity leave and
parents right to part-time work deserve special attention,
because of the unique position maternity leavk and part-time work
have in Norway. When a woman gives birth to a child in Norway,
she has the right to a 52 week full paid maternity leave
immediately after the birth. Few countries in the world have
maternity leaves of this length and the same level of economic
compensation.

The only other developed countries with equivalent

arrangements are Sweden and Denmark. In Sweden, the wage
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compensation is 90 percent, but the maternity leave is eight
weeks longer. In both Norway and Sweden the maternity leave can
be extended for a period of time, but the compensation is
decreased. Also, the father of a child can take a maternity leave
of 90 days. Generally, the wage compensation for fathers is lower
than that for mothers.45Part time work during pregnancy and
after childbirth is also common among women in Norway. The reason
why the Norwegian government facilitates labor force
participation among pregnant women and mothers is twofold. First,
it gives potential mothers the opportunity to have a child
without having to quit working. Second, being out of job for a
period of time may lead to possible long term costs to the
woman's career. Therefore, the Norwegian government emphasizes
both social and pronatalist aspects in its facilitation of part
time work.
An increase in the availability of kindergarten seats and
increased child benefits incurs cost to the society. In terms of
increased child benefits, an important question needs to be
answered. What is the monetary value of a child to society? Put
in another way, the marginal cost to society of a marginal
increase in the number of children should be equal to the
marginal benefit of a marginal increase in the number of
children. Unarguably it is almost impossible to ascertain the
monetary value of a child to society. Therefore, child benefits
can be argued either to be too high or too low dependent upon
subjective opinions about the value of a child. Since child
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benefit payments have increased dramatically in Norway over the
last 30 years, it is reasonable to assume that the value of a
child to society has increased. It should also be emphasized,
however, that the cost of childrearing has increased almost by
the same amount in this period. An increase in the number of
kindergarten seats is positively related to fertility. This
increase will incur costs as in the case of child benefits.
However, an increase in the number of kindergaren seats will
create job opportunities as well. This positive side effect
implies that one instrument (an increase in the number of
kindergarten seats) can satisfy two objectives: increased
fertility as well as the creation of job opportunities.

I

personally believe that instruments with this property should be
pursued by developed countries that want to increase fertility.
In France, perhaps the developed country that emphasizes
pronatalist policy the most, increases in the capacity in
kindergartens have been the chief instrument along with dramatic
changes in the tax system.
The effects of a pronatalistic policy depend on what type of
policy instrument is being used, as well as the intensity of the
policy (e.g., how much money is being spent on child care
services). Today, there is limited research available about the
efficiency of different pronatalistic policies. Consequently, a
comparison of different pronatalistic policy instruments, and a
critical evaluation of the different policies is difficult.
With the dark picture painted by Brunborg and others in
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mind, one can question how expensive progressive or pronatalistic
policies can be justified. I am not proposing that pronatalistic
policies should be abandoned but rather that policy makers should
be aware of the possible inefficiency in these types of policies.
Perhaps inexpensive, indirect pronatalist policies instead should
be pursued by policy makers.

6.3.1

Child Benefits as Pronatalistic Policy in Norway.

A real pronatalistic policy should be arranged in a way that
gives women economic incentives to have more children. This will
be the case if, and only if, child benefits increase
progressively with the number of children (and desired family
size is less than current family size).
When child benefits were introduced in Norway in 1946, they
were arranged as a constant increasing function of the number of
children. At that time the number of births had increased for
several years and more social than pronatalistic considerations
were taken into consideration.
In 19 63, the Norwegian government made child benefits
progressive. Nevertheless, it seems unreasonable to assume that
progressive child benefits were introduced for pronatalistic
reasons since Norway at that time experienced its highest total
fertility rate in 40 years.
As I explained above, child benefits have become
increasingly less progressive over the period 1967-1991, and this
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is still an ongoing trend. What are the reasons for this? Two
answers seem possible:

-The Norwegian government has no pronatalistic attitude.

-Child benefits are not viewed as a pronatalist instrument but
rather as a social instrument used to level out differences in
economic status.

6.4

Some Remarks About Future Population Features in Norway.

This section presents a brief discussion of what to expect
in the future as far as fertility, the size of the population and
age structure are concerned. First, however, I would like to
present the baby boom and baby bust period in total number of
births. The total number of births in a period will cause
generation waves approximately 25 to 35 years later according to
Sundt. Sometimes in demography this effect is referred to as the
echo effect, or population momentum. Figure 10 presents the total
number of births in Norway during the period 1962-1991. The total
number of births was fairly stable, around 55 to 60 thousand in
the 1950s.
As one can see, the total number of births in Norway
displayed large variations over the period 1962-1991. The 1960s
was dominated by a large number of births every year, and is
considered the baby boom era. The peak of the baby boom occured
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in 19 69, never before had the total number of births exceeded 70
thousand in Norway. During the next eight years, Norway
experienced its sharpest continuous decline in the number of
births in recent history. The total number of births decreased
from 70201 in 1969 to to 50708 in 1977, which implies a 27
percent decrease in the number of births in just eight years.

Figure
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From 1977, the total number of births remained stable at around
50 thousand until 1984, which is considered the end of the baby
bust period in Norway. After 1984, Norway experienced an increase
in fertility much do to increased fertility among women above
thirty years of age (see table ll).46 The echo effect from the
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19 60s when the number of births were high also serve as a partial
explanation why the number of births have increased in the late
1980s.

s 11. Age- specific fertility rates. 1984-1992.

Year:

25-29

1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992

123,7
125,5
129,4
131,7
138,6
140,6
144,0
145,1
144,8

Age of women.
30-34
68,20
70,90
74,40
79,70
85,10
91,30
95,20
97,30
99,60

35-39
22,20
22,70
22,20
24,60
27,70
29,70
32,30
35,10
38,80

Source: Official Statistics Norway.
Assuming an echo effect of 25 to 35 years, Norway can expect
an increase in the total number of births in the period 1990 to
2005. However, if the period total fertility rate remains low,
the new boom in the 19 90s will have less impact than the boom in
the 1960s.
Since the total fertility rate is far below replacement
level, which is 2,08 in Norway, the Norwegian population will
start to decline sometime in the future. As argued in chapter
6.2.2 the present net migration level to Norway is neither
sufficient to prevent a population decline nor to increase the
total fertility rate above replacement level. In Christiansen
(1992) I did several projections of the future population in
Norway based on the so called component method.
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The results of the different model specifications are
presented in table 11. From table 11, one can realize the
enormous impact different fertility levels have on the future
population.

If the total fertility rate had dropped to 1.38

(model 1) in 1990, Norway would have experienced a population
decline in the 1990s. In the most likely case in which the total
fertility rate is 1.72 (model 2), the Norwegian population will
increase and reach a maximum of 4.35 million people in 2010. The
reason why the Norwegian population will increase even though the
total fertility rate is below the replacement level is because of
the large cohorts of women in their reproductive ages, and small
cohorts of elderly people. In the final model (model 3), the
total fertility rate is pegged at the replacement level for the
whole period. In this model the population will increase and
almost reach the 5 million mark in 2040.
The results presented in table 11 are sensitive to changes
in demographic components, and must be considered mere
supposition rather than solid research. Also, the time horizon is
rather long, which implies that the extrapolated values of the
population size are uncertain.
If the death and fertility rates are constant over time in a
closed economy (no migration), a constant age structure is
achieved and the population grows or declines at a constant rate
(stable population). This is advantageous for age specific
allocation of resources. If the number of people within the
different age groups remain constant over time, the allocation of
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resources can stay the same provided the relative affluence of
the different age groups is to remain constant.
Table 12.

Projection of future population in Norway.*
Total fertility rate.
Model 3
Model 2
Model 1
(2.08)
(1.72)
(1.38)

Year:
1990
2000
2010
2020
2040

4.24
4.23
4.15
3.98
3.46

4.24
4.33
4.35
4.32
4.08

4.24
4.46
4.59
4.77
4.98

*A11 numbers are in millions.
The age structure in the future in Norway has been examined
thoroughly by Brunborg (1985). He argues that (based on different
assumptions on the components of the basic demographic equation)
there will be a large scale aging of the population. Based on
constant mortality rates and yearly immigration of 4000 as well
as a total fertility rate of 1.72, Brunborg found that the share
of people aged 66 or older would increase from 13 percent in 1985
to 16.4 percent in 2020, and that there would be large increases
among the super elderly (80+). At the same time, the share of
people under 16 years of age would decrease from 23.2 percent in
1985 to 17.3 percent in 2020. However, it seems that the the
number of people that need economic support will remain fairly
stable in the future (when the share of people aged 66 or more
increases, the share of people aged 16 or less decreases).
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Population Policy Since the Mid 1980s.

6.5

An interesting article by Hoem (1990) examines the increase
in total fertility rate experienced in Sweden since approximately
1985. Hoem argues persistently that the increase in total
fertility rate is due to changes in Swedish social or population
policy that intentionally or otherwise provides a financial
incentive to closer spacing of births. What is even more
interesting is the way he compares the fertility increase shared
by the Scandinavian countries Sweden, Norway, and Denmark since
the mid-1980s. Most other European countries have not experienced
this same upward trend in fertility during this period. Hoem
argues:

I know of no other country with a similar political
system and at a comparable stage of industrial
development that has so consequently tried to facilitate
w o m e n 's entry into the labor market and their attachment
to it at minimal cost to childbearing and childrearing.
Ideally, the record high and continuously growing labor
force participation of Swedish women, combined with
comparatively high and generally increasing fertility
should be a reward for such efforts,

(see page 740).

Hoem then explains that Norway, and to some degree Denmark,
closely trail Sweden because of similar efforts in the respective
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countries. I cannot tell if this in fact is a reasonable
explanation, but if it is, pronatalistic policies may have a
future after all. One problem, however, in Hoem's article is that
the time span is less than ten years, which I feel is a rather
short time to base conclusions on.
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CONCLUSION.

7.0

The discussion of the economometric work gave useful answers
to several important questions in economic fertility theories.
Two well known theories have been tested using Norwegian time
series data (the Easterlin hypothesis, and the New Home Economics
approach). Some other variables that are expected to influence
fertility have also been included. The Easterlin hypothesis in
its simplest form was not supported in Norway for the period
1962-1991, even though I suggested that high values for the
relative cohort size seem to explain fertility trends better than
low values. Also a Granger test of causality provided evidence
against the Easterlin hypothesis. All discussion of the Easterlin
hypothesis is based on Easterlin's assumption that relative
cohort size is a good instrumental variable for relative economic
status. Therefore, even though I found evidence against the
relative cohort size and its impact on past fertility trend in
Norway,

I am not able to completely reject the Easterlin

hypothesis (that is if the relative cohort size is a bad
instrumental variable for the relative income hypothesis).
The New Home Economics approach with its emphasis on male
income and female wages is supported in Norway. Male income is,
as expected, positively related to the fertility rate, and female
wage is negatively related to the fertility rate. The other
variables in this model proved less significant, but the model
provides support for a negative relation between female education
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and the fertility rate. Most of the models are tested with both
one and two years effective lags, and the models with two years
effective lag generally are the best ones. The two year lag
models are the ones that take the waiting time to conception, as
described by Bongaarts, into consideration.
As always, however, several important issues have been
neglected because of data collecting problems, and because of
lack of knowledge. A more delicate discussion of the Easterlin
hypothesis with the Oppenheimer approach as a central theme could
perhaps provide some important insight into the Easterlin
hypothesis. An extension of the Granger test that includes not
only the direction of causality, but also the signs of the
coefficients would also be useful. As for the New Home Economics
model, much could have been done to make the analysis more
realistic. Among other things, a single equation model with six
independent variables is not able to explain the
interdependencies that may exist among the independent variables.
For example, it is reasonable to assume that female wage is
positively related to female education. Also, a more complex
child benefit approach that includes child benefits that are
nonlinear functions of birth order would be interesting to
consider in future research. A pooled New Home Economics model
using time series data and cross sectional data for the
Scandinavian countries, for example, may provide some additional
insight. This procedure will result in more observations and thus
more efficient parameter estimates.
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From the discussion provided in this paper it seems obvious
that the New Home Economics approach fits the post World War II
experience in Norway better than the Easterlin hypothesis. In
particular, the Butz and Ward approach seems to fit Norwegian
material particularly well. In simplicity the Butz and Ward
approach is based on a complex relation between male and female
wages. They argue that the baby boom was primarily due to rising
male income, and that the baby bust was due to rising female
wages. This seems to be a likely explanation for the post World
War II fertility experience in other European countries as well.
Most of the European countries have experienced rising male
income and rising female wages. The male-female wage ratio has
declined, and female labor force participation has increased.
These are all factors that support the Butz and Ward approach. I,
therefore, believe that future research aimed at testing New Home
Economics models in most European countries would be fruitful.
Finally, it would be interesting to see the New Home Economics
model applied to undeveloped and developing countries. My guess
is that the New Home Economics model would be inappropriate in
such countries because of low female labor force participation
and large male to female wage ratios.

7.1

What Can be Expected from Migration Policy?

Based on the discussion, the effect of a migration policy in
Norway is at least uncertain. It is obvious that positive net
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migration will increase the population, but the current net
migration level of approximately four thousand people annually is
not sufficient to prevent a decrease in the Norwegian population
in the long run (see the discussion in chapter 6.4). A more
selective migration policy, biased toward young immigrants from
third world countries, could change this picture, but such a
policy can be hard to enforce when immigrants from third world
countries already contribute about 90 percent of the total net
migration. Lifting the immigration ban is a possible, but not a
realistic, option in Norway today. However, adopting some form of
immigration quotas may be an alternative that would be acceptable
to most of the political parties. A possible EC membership will
not change population features in Norway much more than what the
free Nordic labor market has accomplished. When Norway
experiences good times, the net labor migration from the other
Nordic countries tends to increase and vice versa. In the extreme
case, when the EC is completely integrated (in which each country
is like a state in a larger country, as in the U.S.) absolute
advantage in production may cause large rural areas in Norway to
be completely depopulated. To sum up briefly, instituational
arrangements, immigration ban, and the large share of refugees
among the immigrants in Norway makes migration policy somewhat
sterile in influencing the inevitable depopulation of Norway in
the future (with current levels of the total fertility rate). In
any circumstances, it is unrealistic to expect that fertility
among immigrants alone can raise the total fertility rate above
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replacement level.
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APPENDIX

In this appendix I provide the results obtained from the
three year lag model of the Easterlin hypothesis, as well as a
semi log model of the New Home Economics model. The implication
of these results are not discussed, so the models are just
included for interested readers.

Model (1) lnTFRt= a1 + a2lnRCSt_3+et

t=1962, ... #1991.

Table 1. The statistical significance of the
relative cohort size using a log linear model
(model 1) lagged three years.*
Three year lag
Variable
Relative cohort size

1.870
(4.747)

Intercept

-0.406
(-2.051)

Adj R-sq:
Number o b s :
DW-statistic
DW-critical:

0.4465
26
0.186
1.30-1.46

XA11 t-statistics are given in parentheses.
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Model (2) blnTFRt.= p1 + p2dlnRCSt_3 +et

t=1 9 6 2 1 9 9 1 .

where SlnTFRt= lnTFRt- l n T F R ^ A blnRCSt= lnRCSt- l n R C S ^

Table 2. The statistical significance of the relative cohort
size using a first differenced log linear model
lagged three years (model 2)*
Three year lag.
Variable:
Relative cohort size:

0.156
(0.613)

Intercept:

-0.014
(-2.167)

Adj R-sq:
Number o b s :
DW-statistic:

-0.0256
25
0.840

'tf-w-. t-statistics
.
'r'y •
■
*A11
are■ given
in parentheses.
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M odel

(3) I n

In T F R jjj

tfr h i= y 1 +

Cl +

y 21 nRCSHI_3 + eHI

+ ®LO

Table 6. The significance of the relative cohort size using
log linear models, when relative cohort size is
divided in high and low observations (model 3).*
Three year lag
Variable:
Low levels:
Relative cohort size:

-0.138
(-0.076)

Intercept:

0.732
(0.769)

Adj R-sq:
Number o b s :

-0.090
12

High levels:
Relative cohort size:

2.757
(8.110)

Intercept:

-0.944
(-4.433)

Adj R-sq:
Number o b s :

0.8437
12

___
*A11 t-statistics are
given in parenthesis.
^
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Model (4) lnTFRt= b1+ 62Xlt.D + Z3X2t_n + 64X3t_n +

Where n=1,2.

+ 66X 5 t_n + b7X6t_a*et

t=1962,...,1991.

Table 8. Semi log model on: Male and female wages, child
benefits, seats in kindergarten, unemployment
benefits, females in higher education. TFR is
still the dependent variable (model 4).*

Number of lags.
1 Year.

2 Year.

Xl=Male wage:

14.19977
(1.761)

24.89061
(3.139)

X2=Female wage

-21.91278
(-2.311)

-31.10592
(-3.312)

X3=Female edu:

-0.008055
(-1.329)

-0.005526
(-0.823)

X4=Child benefit:

0.000033
(2.750)

-0.00005
(-0.039)

X5=Kindergarten:

-0.000059
(-0.050)

0.000390
(-0.356)

X6=Unempl. benef

0.002644
(1.184)

0.006325
(3.103)

Variable:

Intercept:

Number of obs:
Adj R-sq:
DW-statistic:

1.225174
(3.405)

29
0.8146
0.677

0.348547
(1.006)

28
0.8154
0.853

*A11 t-values are presented in parentheses.
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